



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA

MINISTRY OF PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2017 – 2019

MID TERM REVIEW

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BY:



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The NDP mid-term review team from KasmDev consulted with and/or referenced documents from many stakeholders during the review process. These stakeholders included: Federal government ministries, Federal Member State Ministries of Planning, donors, UN and WB, International NGOs, Pillar working group leads, and others. The review team is grateful to all of them for giving their time and sharing their experiences and knowledge. We are particularly indebted to the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), whose facilitation was critical for the team to get access to government ministries.

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ACRONYMS

- ACU – Aid Coordination Unit
- AfDB – African Development Bank
- AIMS – Aid Information Management System
- AIMS – Aid Information Management System
- BMZ – German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation & Development
- BRA – Banadir Regional Administration
- BRCiS – Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
- CAS- Comprehensive Approach to Security
- CHASP – Community Health and Social Accountability Program
- COM – Council of Ministers
- CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child
- CSO – Civil Society Organization
- DFID – Department for International Development
- DG- director General
- DOCC – Disaster Operation Centers
- DP – Development partners
- DPM – Deputy Prime Minister
- EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
- ESIA – Environment & Social Impact Assessment
- ESPOEA – Mission Espana OEA
- ESSP – Education Sector Strategic Plan
- EU – European Union
- EU – European Union
- EWARN – Early Warning Alert & Response Network
- EWARN – Early Warning Alert & Response Network
- FAO – Food & Agriculture Organization
- FEWSNET- Famine early warning system network
- FGS – Federal Government of Somalia
- FMS – Federal Member States
- FMS – Federal Member States
- FNTC – Federalization Negotiating Technical Committee
- FNTC – Federalization Negotiating Technical Committee
- FSNAU – Food Security & Nutrition Analysis Unit
- GAVI - A Global Vaccine Alliance – international organization
- GDP – Gross Domestic Product
- GEEL – Growth, Enterprise, Employment & Livelihoods
- GER - General Enrolment Rate
- HACCP – Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Point
- HMIS – Health Management Information Systems
- HPG – Humanitarian Policy Group
- HSS – Health Strengthening Systems
- ICRIC - Independent Constitutional Review & Implementation Commission
- IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
- IFI – International Financial Institution
- ILO – International Labour Organization
- IMF – International Monetary Fund
- INGO – International non-government organization
- IRF – International Response Fund
- IUU – Illegal, Unreported & Unregulated Fishing
- JMP – Joint Monitoring Program?
- JRES – Joint Review of the Education Sector
- M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
- MAF – Mutual Accountability Framework
- MIA - Mogadishu International Airport
- MIS - Management Information System
- MOCA - Ministry of Constitutional Affairs (MOCA),
- MoECHE – Ministry of Education, Culture & Higher Education
- MoHADM – Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
- MOLSA – Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs
- MoPIED – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
- MoPIED – Ministry of Planning, Investment & Economic Development of the Federal Government of Somalia
- MPF – Multi Partner Fund
- MPF – Multi Partner Fund
- MPWRH – Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction & Housing
- MTR – Midterm Review
- NDC – National Development Councils
- NEAR – Network for Empowered Aid Response
- NES – National Employment Strategy
- NGO – Non-government organization
- NHCC – National Humanitarian Coordination Center
- NPS – New Partnership for Somalia
- NPS – New partnership for Somalia
- NSC – National Security Council
- NSDS- National Strategy for Development of Statistics
- OC-
- ODA – Official Development Assistance
- ODF – Open Defecation Free
- OPM – Office of the Prime Minister
- PFM – Public Financial Management

- PIMS- Promoting Inclusive Market System
- PMO – Prime Minister’s Office
- PWG – Pillar Working Group
- RAP – Resettlement Action Plan
- RRF – Recovery, Resilience Framework
- RRF –Recovery & Resilience Framework
- SDG – Somalia Donor Group
- SDG – sustainable development goals
- SDRF – Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
- SHF – Somalia Humanitarian Fund
- SIF – Somalia Infrastructure Fund
- SMAC – Social Mobilization & Communication Strategy
- SMP – Staff Monitored Program
- SNDP – Somali National Development Plan (1-9)
- SOMREP – Somalia Resilience Program
- STREAM- Somalia resilience action consortium
- SUN – Scaling Up Nutrition
- SWSS – South west state of Somalia
- TOR – Terms of Reference
- UCS – Use of Country Systems
- UN – United Nations
- UN OCHA – United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- UNICEF – United Nations Children Emergency Fund
- UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services
- WASH – Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
- WB – World Bank
- WHO – World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

a) Introduction

The 8th Somali National Development Plan (NDP) under the mid-term review covers the fiscal period 2017 to 2019. Building on a strong foundation and lessons from the new deal compact, NDP8 was premised on a strongly Somali-owned, Somali-led development initiative and was praised for shifting focus from exclusive humanitarian approach to aid, and imbedding the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Somalia's development agenda. This version of the NDP has taken strong socio-economic reformist approach to development through poverty alleviation, economic revival and societal transformation in a socially just and gender equitable manner. NDP8 seeks to: (a) articulating Government development priorities; (b) provide a structure for resource allocation and management; (c) guide development partner's support within the defined FGS priorities of fiscal period 2017-9 and (d) serve as an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy and align it with the global SDG initiative. A key success of the NDP is measured by the degree of improvement in the lives of citizens, the mechanism put in place for effective, efficient and sustainable delivery of the development agenda. For this purpose, the government has put in place robust Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework, which provided for Annual, Mid Term and End-line evaluations.

The objectives of mid-term review of National Development Plan include: (a) Measure progress made towards the NDP goals and management of its implementation process; (b) Identify gaps, challenges and lessons learnt during the first half of the NDP implementation; (c) Make practical recommendations for improved implementation of its 2nd phase; (d) Inform preparation of NDP 9 (2020-2024); and (e) Set new baselines where such information is absent in the indicator matrices.

The MTR exercise has generally adopted a macro level study approaches, heavily relying on secondary data. The review gathered substantial data from numerous strategic, operational sources of information, with a view to obtaining insights into the overall status of the NDP and its impacts. This is not to say that the importance of the primary data was overlooked. The review team spent considerable amount of time triangulating information with key informants in order to minimise margin error. In the process the review sourced valuable insight from over 46 respondents from key institutions of the government at federal and member states levels, interventional development partners, the private sector, and limited sample from the public, through direct interviews, written questionnaires and focus group discussions.

Unfortunately, however, the MTR team was unable to visit Hirshabelle due to ongoing timeframe as well logistical and security limitations. But the team made efforts to source valuable facts from KIs in these states by phone etc.

b) Findings

Somalia National Development Plan (NDP) was hailed as the first Somali-owned and Somali-led development in 30 years and for embedding the SDGs, gender and human rights. It was however, criticised for being overly ambitious in its goals and timeframe and for lack of clear financing strategy.

The Somalia aid architecture though provided a useful platform for coordination and financing, these efforts were more effective at the strategic and policy level (FGS) than they were at the operation (State level). SDRF, managed about 20% of the total aid in Somalia, leaving about 80% outside the control of these mainstream mechanisms. Comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation framework were in place, but there was little evidence of any effective monitoring output due to poor capacity and lack of credible data. Towards the MAF, marginal progress was made in the political settlements, security, rule of law, youth empowerment, financial and economic management, gender and human rights as well and inclusion and resilience in shared goals, while Somali ownership and alignment, use of preferred instruments for coordination, transparent and accountability and host of cross-cutting themes covered good ground in principle of partnership.

Performance of mandated instructions: Public and private institutions have all important parts to play in the successful implementation of the National Development Plan. Noticeable efforts were shown by NDP lead institution such the aid coordination and delivery units of the OPM; M&E and Statistics of MOPIED and MOF who despite failed to raised specific funds for the delivery of NDP 8 implementation, created progressive environment on which

future NDP can thrive. Development Partners were instrumental to the government efforts to deliver on the NDP through financial, technical and expert advisory, but have long way to go in the effective NDP alignment, coordination and financing through government fiscal budget for improved prospects of Somali-led development.

Overall progress towards key development indicators could barely be determined due to lack of data. 65% of the total indicators lacked baseline data, 58% of the total indicators were without updated data. Where both baseline and updated data were available, only 8% of the indicators (scattered across sectors) were on track, while 13% were off track, the remaining 79% of the indicators could not be determined because lack baseline or updated data. Sectors such as Nutrition, Health, Education, Agriculture, and Macroeconomics in that order, were able to give baseline data for at least 40% of their indicators, while Agriculture, Education, WATSAN, Health, Macroeconomics, and Aid Management sectors, in that order had most upto date data on at least over 50% of their indicators.

c) Gaps, Challenges and Lessons

- i. **NDP design/scope:** NDP goals, and outcome indicators were found unsustainable within the three years timeframe, given the prevailing security, political and social realities and the frequent climate induced emergencies
- ii. **NDP Budgeting:** There were not comprehensive costing (Budget) for the NDP as a whole, or the related institutional workplans; the targets are overly ambitious, intuitional work plans (Ministries, PWGs, etc.) lacked clear logical follow (i.e. line ministry workplans do not necessary translate into NDP outcomes
- iii. **NDP Financing:** The NDP was designed with no clear financing mechanisms or sources in mind, and resources from the international development were not fragmented and did not necessary NDP-specific.
- iv. **Diverse donor interests and values** leaves significant proportions of funding from non-traditional, bilateral sources unreported in the mainstream NDP coordination forums;
- v. **Development is not fully Somali-owned, Somali-led:** while in theory, development concepts and plans are largely Somali-led and Somalia owned, the inability of the government to finance such initiative gives the DPs leverage to determine how their resources is used.
- vi. **NDP implementation: Volatile political and security environment for the** limited NDP coverage, confused aid coordination by sending discordant signals to development partners and hampered collective achievements
- vii. **Weak national statistics,** renders effective monitoring and evaluation impossible without credible data from recent national census and/or routine surveys or input from well-coordinated national development programs.
- viii. **Monitoring and Evaluations** Directorate is facing severe technical, technological, financial and access constraints to be effective in the role;
- ix. **NDP coordination mechanism** is vibrant at strategic level but weak at operational (State and regional) level; effectiveness at the operational level is weak; lack of forward looking and substance agenda, junior representation from federal member states was blamed for advancing NDP at the operational level;
- x. **Conflicting priorities** between the FGS and DPs and encompassing scope of the NDP, presented formidable challenge for the government to adequately enforce alignment with and implementation of the IDP
- xi. **The private sectors as a key stakeholder of the NDP** is critical for the development of the country but they are not adequately engaged their potentials involvement in the NDP particularly at the operational level is untapped;
- xii. **Growing Internationalization of aid threatens sustainability development work;** a negligible proportion (3.5% of estimated 1.4 billion) of aid funds are currently assigned to the local development actors

d) Recommendations

- i. Develop long term visions from which realistic NDPs are extracted, to make the NDP goals more attainable within the overall timelines.
- ii. Budget proactively for the NDP and engage bilateral and multilateral donors at the earliest stages of NDP for more predictable reliable financing of its implementation, monitoring and evaluation
- iii. Increase commitment to Somali-owned, Somalia-led development by giving increased control of funds to the government
- iv. Create conducive political, security, and governance environment for timely NDP implementation and ensuring its sustainability:

- v. Strengthen national statistics capability so that it become a source of credible and up-to-date data and information for all national development indicators.
- vi. Strengthen the capacity of the national M&E Directorate through increased and technically sound manpower and technological investment so that there is better data management, increased transparency and easier access to information on development programmes their impact
- vii. Aid structures and coronations should structure in a way that federal level coordination meetings should focus more on strategic and policy level discussion while state level meetings should be concerned more with NDP implementation, monitoring and evaluation, for increased cost effectiveness and better control
- viii. Government needs to accommodate funding criteria of key international development partners to encourage inflow of aid for national development needs;
- ix. Government to bring the private sectors on board the NDP through increased engagements for ease of monitoring their input into the national development through employment creation, financial aid to the government, domestic revenue mobilization and disaster risk reduction and response.
- x. The government should Streamline donor funding from all kind of for ease of accountability for the NDP, by creating separate coordination environment where all development partners see value in their participation
- xi. Encourage Localisation of development for increasing the capacity of local humanitarian and development actors to ensure wider coverage of interventions and sustainability; the government should put in place the necessary regulatory frameworks to ensure accountability.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Somali National Development Plan (NDP) covers the fiscal period 2017 to 2019. This 8th NDP is the first one developed by a central government of Somalia since 1986. It builds on a strong foundation by and lessons from the new deal compact, which articulated national priorities between 2014-2016. While the new deal was generally hailed for its role in creating good mechanisms for cooperation between the donor communities and Somalia government but also among donors, it was criticised for being centred primarily on interests of international donors and their cooperative arrangements¹. It relied heavily on foreign technical expertise and limited consultations.

In contrast, the National Development Plan (NDP 2017-2019) was largely Somali-led, developed through an extensive consultation, and on a strong will, on the part of the government, to make it a genuinely make it work. The NDP was also praised for shifting focus from exclusive humanitarian approach to aid, putting the country and its international development partners on a long-term developmental trajectory, with a focus on durable solutions to long standing challenge, ranging from dilapidated infrastructure, to the dearth of social services and the plight of displaced people. Most importantly, the NDP introduced Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into the national aid and development agenda.

The overarching theme of the NDP was to accelerate socio-economic transformation in order to achieve the stated objectives for poverty alleviation, economic revival and societal transformation in a socially just and gender equitable manner.

The National Development Plan has four keys interrelated objectives:

- e) Articulating Government development priorities
- f) Provide a structure for resource allocation and management
- g) Guide Development Partner support within the defined FGS priorities for fiscal period 2017-9
- h) Serve as an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy and align it with the global SDG initiative

Underpinning these in NDP 8, are Strong governance, particularly in the areas of inclusive and democratic institutions, political participation, promotion of a vibrant civil society, transparent and accountable public administration, protection of human rights and promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment. The NDP also recognizes the need to equitably address the development needs of the Somali population who are displaced inside the country or returning from surrounding countries.

It was envisioned that the implementation of the NDP will be reinforced by activities that will help create a conducive environment, for the sustainability of its outcomes. This will entail making robust yet sustained improvements on the political, security, governance, social and economic conditions of the country. It will also entail continuous public-private dialogue between members of the government, members of the private sector and citizens.

A key measurement of success be how well it improves the lives of citizens but given the prevailing political economic and social realities that sounds the NDP, attaining significant success will call for “a marshal plan”. “Somalia’s population is predominantly young. Almost half of the population is less than 15 years old. More than half of Somali households are headed by women. 2 in 3 households in Mogadishu and IDP Settlements are headed by men. The average household size is 5.3 Household size decreases with income. The poverty headcount ranges from 61 to 88 percent. Somalia ranks among the poorest countries in the World. The top

¹ role-of-ngos-in-the-somalia-national-development-plan.pdf

20 percent consume six times more than the bottom 20 percent. 8 in 10 households did not experience hunger in February 2016 Households in IDP Settlements report hunger more often”.

1.2 Mid-term Review of NDP 8

For purposes of ascertaining its effectiveness, the NDP has a robust monitoring and evaluations framework designed for purposes measuring progress periodically. The M&E arrangements include the Mid-Term Review (MTR) which was geared towards flagging early warnings for timely recourse in its implementation if need be.

1.2.1 Objectives of the MTR

Mid-Term Review of National Development Plan seeks to:

- a) Measure progress made towards the NDP goals and management of its implementation process;
- i) Identify gaps, challenges and lessons learnt during the first half of the NDP implementation;
- j) Make practical recommendations for improved implementation of its 2nd phase;
- k) Inform preparation of NDP 9 (2020-2024)
- l) Set new baselines where such information is absent in the indicator matrices;

1.2.2 Rationale of the MTR

The National Development Plan requires that MoPIED commissions an independent Mid-Term Review and Final evaluations of the NDP by Mid 2018 and end of 2019 respectively.

In addition to the objectives listed above, the MTR will be useful in providing feedback based on the findings of an independent evaluations of its overall progress, process and outcomes, primarily to the Ministry of planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED) for purposes of:

- (a) tracking implementation status and the impact of the NDP;
- (b) draw important lessons from the NDP implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting process and (b) informing the development of the new National Development Plan (NDP 9).

The MTR report will also be of great use to a wide range of governmental and non-governmental institutions, who play a role in its financing, implementations and oversight. In addition, the MTR findings will be helpful in:

- a) Informing the development and design of government policies, programmes, and projects;
- b) Improving the confidence in the capability of their Government;
- c) Strengthening partnerships and promote cross-learning among key stakeholders;
- d) instilling a culture of learning from mistakes, and increasing data demand and information use;
- e) Promote accountability and transparency;

1.2.3 Scope of the MTR

in terms of scope, the MTR covers 3 main areas: the timeframe, geographical coverage, and thematic scope. Regarding the time frame, the NDP covers three years (from January 2017 to December 2018). The Mid-term review is therefore focussed on the first half, (18 month) of NDP implementation (January 2017-June 2018);

Geographically, the MTR is a national exercise, covering the entire jurisdiction of the federal Government of Somalia. This includes, all the relevant institutions at the Federal Government of Somalia, Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) and the five Federal Member States (FMS), namely Jubbaland, Southwest, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Puntland.

Thematically, the Mid Term Review, will respond to the following MTR questions:

1. How much progress has been made towards the goals and key outcome of the NDP (2017-2019) and how well were these outcomes aligned with the SDGs?
2. How well was the NDP implementation process managed, with particular attentions to:
 - a) Coordination arrangements (NPS, SDRF and Pillar working groups,)?
 - b) Partnership principles and mutual accountability - to what extent were:
 - (i) Developments a Somali-owned and Somali-led?
 - (ii) Development Aid: aligned with overall Government priorities and sector plans?
 - (iii) Development Aid: operations designed and delivered in partnership with government institutions and in most pressing priorities?
 - c) Monitoring, Evaluation and Statistical function?
 - d) Effectiveness of key Institutions (Parliament, OPM, MoPIED, MOF, line Ministries, FMSs, etc) in their roles and responsibilities?
 - e) Development Aid was channelled through preferred instruments of the government?

1.2.4 Review Limitations

There were many challenges faced during the preparation and data collection phase of the MTR of the national Development plan (2017-2019). These challenges included but not limited to the following:

- The MTR was evaluating a high-level (outcome) NDP indicators, which require credible data from a nationwide survey, census (no recent one), fully functional national statistical systems and multiple development programs. Lack of these has hampered scale and quality of the information available to the MTR.
- Government institution, including some of the lead ministries of NDP pillar, have demonstrated limited awareness of the National Development Plan, and its M&E and reporting requirements; most also lacked technical capacity to conduct M&E, including useful inputs for this MTR in their sectors; most line ministries also lack records of development programs under their portfolio/sectors; and In some instance, there were lack of cooperation, failing avail themselves for the MTR appointments or provide written data and information to consultants' request;
- The assigned time was unreasonably short for effective preparation and completion of the MTR. The MTR was expected to collect, organize, process and analyse huge datasets from fragmented, scattered and uncoordinated programmes, target audiences in the vast country. The MTR also came at time when the international development partners who lead and co-lead pillar working, were out of the country, for their breaks during the festive seasons;
- Lack of well-coordinated development programmes implemented in the country by various levels and institutions of the government, the United nations, International non-governmental Organisations, and untraditional bilateral donors such as the Arab countries/organizations or charities and Turkey government, and among others throughout sectors of the NDP (education, health, and Infrastructure and resilience, etc).
- Difficulties in scheduling meetings, with the public and government officials for a number of reasons:
 - ⇒ Most of the target audience insisted on face-to-face interviews, as opposed to electronic interviews such as Skype; this was in the context of heightened security alerts in Mogadishu, at a time when there were high profile visits in the country, and increased security incidents that necessitated restricted along specific roads and limited visits to major government installations,
 - ⇒ The study was also commissioned at the time of heightened political tensions between the federal government of Somalia and some of its member states, which limited the ability of a FGS commissioned study to freely access information or physically contact state officials.
- The MTR tool (M&E matrix) has critical information (baseline, Target) missing;

1.2.5 Methodology

The MTR exercise adopted macro level approaches, with a bird's eye view of both the status of the key development indicator and effectiveness of managing the NDP implantation process. To that effect, the review process utilised a mixture of secondary and primary approaches to data collection:

a) Secondary - Desk Review

The MTR team reviewed numerous strategic, operational and technical secondary sources of information, with a view to obtaining insights into the overall status of the NDP implementation process and its impacts, based on the outcome indicators. Over 150 documents with direct and indirect relevancy to the Somalia national development plan, and its implementation, and oversight processes were reviewed. They ranged from strategic documents such as; official strategic plans of key ministries & institutions, government policies and frameworks related to the NDP implementations to sets of operational and administrative records such minutes of meetings by the various NDP coordination structures such as SDRF & PWGs and their sectoral work plans and reports.

The central data depository systems of the directorates of national statistics and M&E were also consulted to keep abreast of the state of the national development against the NDP baselines. Periodic NDP review reports by MoPIED, and sectoral updates by various government institutions and their development partners have also formed important sources of information for the MTR.

The MTR also utilised relevant publication (including research papers) from independent multilateral agencies such as the Africa development bank (AfDB), The World Back Group (WBG), International Mentoring Fund (IMF), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the United Nations (UN) agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations and civil societies.

b) Key informant interviews

The review team spent considerable amount of time triangulating information from secondary sources with key informants and vice-versa in order to guard against falsehoods and biases that may skew the analysis and findings.

The review process sourced specialized information from a cross-section of experts, some of whom were selected for their role in the development, implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation of the NDP. Over 26 senior staff and officials including director generals, senior technical advisors and technical teams from key ministries largely at federal levels were interviewed or asked to fill out semi-structured questionnaires. Information was also sourced from key directorates of MoPIED, including the planning and economic development, Monitoring and Evaluation, and national statistics.

During the MTR, consultants made visits to Mogadishu, the base of the Federal government of Somalia and Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) to meet key informants from line ministries, government agencies, and key institutions who have a role in the NDP implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The team has also interviewed government representatives in Kismayo, Galmudug and Baidoa, the interim bases of, Galmudug, Jubbaland and Southwest states of Somalia respectively to gather data from representatives of government departments, development partners, and the public. In addition to Ministries of Planning at the federal government and members state levels, which were the primary contacts for the MTR team, reviewers spent time with planning, monitoring, and evaluation focal points of the other line ministries to discuss progress made towards the relevant development indicators, effectiveness of implementation management process and gaps, challenges, lessons during the midterm implementation phase of the NDP.

The team has also gathered pertinent information and data through roundtable discussions and on-one interview with representatives of donor agencies and implementing partners working in Somalia in Nairobi and in Somalia. The team also met government officials, experts, project implementers, among others, who travelled out of Somalia, to attend various meetings in Nairobi.

Unfortunately the MTR team was unable to visit some of the other states due to logistical, security or political challenges.

2. MANAGEMENT OF NDP IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS


During the midterm and review, the Ministry of Planning, Investments and Economic Development (MoPIED), which lead the crafting and the implementation of the national Development Plan (2017-2019) have successfully established and operationalised some basic mechanism for the implementation of NDP 8. These include Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E); National [project] Authorisation Office (NAO) for EU projects and National Statistical functions. The coordination structures are also fairly well established, and International Development Partners have made endeavours in financial aid and alignments of the development programs with the NDP and to in some limited degree, in a Somalia-led-Somali-owned manner.

This section will examine the effectiveness of these implementation mechanisms and how well they key public and private institutions have executed their responsibilities to the planning, implementation and oversight.

2.1 Effectiveness of the coordination framework

Although their effectiveness was questioned by the key informants from both the government and its International partners, there are fairly good coordination and financing forums that consist of: the (a) the Somalia Partnership Forum (SPF), (b) the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Fund (SDRF) Steering Committee, (c) Pillar Working Groups (PWG) and their sub-committees as summarised in figure 1 below and discussed in the subsequent sub-sections that flow.

Figure 2: Somalia aid architecture



Source: MoPIED

2.1.1 New Partnership for Somalia (NPS)

The New Partnership for Somalia (NPS), which replaced the New Deal compact, sets out how Somalia and the international community can come together to meet Somalia's most pressing political, security and economic priorities on the basis of mutual accountability and partnership principles and in line with the National Development Plan. The Somalia Partnership Forum (SPF) has convened three times during the period under review (MTR) to take stock of progress under the NPS; it was held in May and December 2017 and July 2018. In December 2017, the NPS identified security, the constitutional settlement, inclusive politics, human rights and the rule of law, good governance, measures to tackle corruption, responding to humanitarian crises, and promoting economic recovery as priorities for shared action.

The SPF has been a critical forum for assessing progress made by the government and its partners and building consensus around mutually agreed priorities for development funding. In the last meeting, which convened on July 17th, 2018, the government of Somalia was applauded for setting and advancing on a number of critical fronts in its development agenda. They include, but are not limited to: reconciliation, stability, security and economic growth. This was despite the extraordinary challenges facing the country. While the MTR shares this assessment, it has noted the limitations with regards to the ability of the government to maintain the momentum and safeguard the gains made. It's also become evident through the MTR process that most of the development were confined to the key cities and to some limited degree, districts under the government's control, leaving out populations in areas under the control of the insurgents. Furthermore, government institutions mandated to implement the NDP require capacities, both financial and operational, to sustain them in the face of a challenging security and climatic conditions.

Originally established to guide implementation of the Somalia Compact, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) provides an aid architecture for coordinating efforts under the National Development Plan (NDP). As a financing architecture, the SDRF brings together three multi-partner trust funds names (a) UN Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), (b) World Bank Multi Partner Fund (MPF) and (c) African Development Bank (AfDB) Somali Infrastructure Fund (SIF). Under common governance arrangements the multi-partner trust funds are meant to promote: (a) coordination across activities and instruments, (b) alignment with national priorities, and (c) reduced transaction costs for government.

According to WBG (2017), "the World Bank MPF and the UN National Window provide a means for donors to indirectly channel funds through government Public Finance Management (PFM) systems."² As of the end of 2018, the World Bank MPF had disbursed US\$ 156.2 million out of US\$ 209.3 million³ in committed donor funds for government implemented grants. Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank State-and Peace-building Fund have all contributed to the fund. Italy, Sweden and the UN Peacebuilding Fund have contributed to the UN "National Window" under the UN MPTF, which has disbursed US\$ 8.7 million through government implemented grants as of the end of 2018.⁴

While the SDRF remains a critical platform for aid coordination of Somalia, the use of the funds established under the SDRF remains low (MoPIED. 2018). Only 22% of development aid was channelled through the funds in 2018, yet a disproportionate amount of attention is spent discussing the funds in the aid architecture. This puts limitations on the ability of the SDRF to serve as a mechanism for the government overseeing and guide the activities of its development partners, as was envisioned by the SDRF. The SDRF has the potential to be a more effective funding mechanism if the donors use it to the fullest, and if the aid architecture is utilized more as a platform for strategic dialogue on issues beyond project approvals for the SDRF funds. It is also not clear how the SDRF and the Council of Ministers reconcile their priorities, as some government official feel that the SDRF conflicts with the role of the Council of Ministers in approving development projects. Although, it should be noted that the Council of Ministers have a voice in the SDRF, which provides a unique platform for decisions on donor-financed projects to be taken collectively with government.

As a coordination platform, the SDRF is credited with providing a much-needed forum for dialogue and engagement between Development Partners (DPs), Federal Member States (FMS) and other institutions of the Federal

²<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/779801520341781240/pdf/123945-WP-PUBLIC-P164350-UseofCountrySystemsReport.pdf>

³ <http://mof.gov.so/public-expenditure>

⁴ Based on reporting by the SDRF funds and MoF records.

Government of Somalia (FGS). During the New Deal era, the FMS felt underrepresented in all the major coordination forums. There was also a general perception among the government institutions that most coordination platforms were donor driven processes, by virtue of the resources they control.

To address these concerns, a number of improvements were made to national coordination platforms including the SDRF Steering Committee, in relation to control and representation. The formation of the National Development Council (NDC) was geared towards creating a mechanism for building intra-state consensus ahead of SDRF Steering Committee meetings. Reviews of the SDRF minutes show that FMSs are represented in the SDRF steering committee meetings with their share of contribution to the agendas. This is in the backdrop of unstable cooperation and intermittent tension between FMS and FGS.

The SDRF Steering Committee has also created two slots for civil society representations. Although still underrepresented, the slots for the civil society was an important move for devolved implementation of the NDP to the grassroots. Civil society organizations are the largest development actors present across districts of the country. Their representation in such forums is crucial for increasing citizen participation in national development plans, through increased awareness and opportunity to hold mandated institutions accountable. The SDRF made initial steps towards sharing information with civil society and opening up dialogue on pertinent developments and amassing international support under a common framework. Minutes from the SDRF reveal a rich and diverse discussion and debate on both the strategic and project levels.

Interviews with government officials commended the Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) under the Prime Minister's office for providing a well-coordinated secretariat and logistical support for this, the PWGs and other aid coordination mechanism as whole.

More could be done by all stakeholders, both from government and development partners, to implement the recommendations from the June 2018 workshop on improving the effectiveness of the aid architecture. One of the challenges in implementing the recommendations has been the heaviness of the structures themselves, which are difficult not only for those responsible for coordinating the meetings, but also for participants to engage consistently and strategically at both the levels of the SDRF Steering Committee and Pillar Working Groups.

2.1.2 Pillar Working and Sub-working groups

MoPIED ensured the formation and alignment of the Pillar Working Groups (PWGs) with those of the thematic pillars of the NDP for 2017-19. Additionally, as envisaged in the NDP, the line ministries were designated as the core owners of all the programs, which reinforced the need for government ownership in the design and implementation of the NDP. The aid architecture includes nine PWGs, anchored around the NDP objectives.

One major role envisaged for the PWGs was to promote sector-level coordination in alignment with the NDP priorities. The review noted a considerable effort were made in the reconfiguration of the previous working groups and the establishment of additional new working groups in line with the pillars. The government has employed consistent messaging and rallying institutions and forums such as the SPF, SDRF and PWGs behind the NDP to maintain momentum.

The PWGs took long to form and start work, hampering the groups' ability to deliver on their core functions such as, ensuring effective alignment of development projects with the NDP priorities; knowledge sharing and developing supportive policy frameworks and the collective monitoring and reporting of the NDP progress. For instance, some of the PWGs were still deliberating on TORs in early 2018, despite the Oct 2017 deadline for MoPIED to present them to the SDRF. Furthermore, FGS was conspicuously missing during some of the PWG meetings, while FMS and donors attended. The PWGs attribute these delays to the electioneering period and subsequent transition period of the new government in early 2017. The leadership of the PWGs were said to have fallen far behind their schedules to provide the necessary direction and guidance to the members. Minutes of the PWGs also reveal that work plan discussions progressed well into the first quarter of 2018.

Although the Federal Ministers and DGs chair the PWGs to gives it the necessary clout, some members lamented that the PWGs' mandate was limited to 'rubber stamping' project preconceived, designed and approved by donors devoid of any government input on NDP alignment. The government also does not have the resources and technical capacity to monitor and evaluate the projects once they are endorsed for implementation.

The review team has determined that, the links between the PWGs and the FMS are weak and uncoordinated. While the FMS are members of the Pillar Working Groups, junior staff are often assigned to attend the meetings. The large number of groups and sub working groups makes it difficult for the FMS to engage consistently at a higher level. In this case, it is unclear how much of the discourse and action plans at the PWGs and to a larger extent, at the federal level, that trickle down to the states and to local authorities. The review underscores the inadequacy and lack of coherence between the regional and sub-regional systems and structures and the federal system and structure. This lack of coherence makes it challenging for any meaningful alignment of development programs into the NDP priorities. It further reduces opportunities for effective monitoring and evaluation of the NDP progress particularly by FMS. A review and adjustment of the current implementation structure, with the objective of decentralizing implementation, may be needed to give FMS and FGS institutions greater understanding and control over development activities thereby, contributing to the better realization of the NDP objectives.

The relationship between the UN-led humanitarian clusters and the PWGs is unclear. While it is largely the same people and institutions involved in the clusters and PWGs, there seems to be a lack of coherence. This is particularly important, given that humanitarian aid accounts for nearly half of the total aid in Somalia (ODI, 2017).

With regard to the effectiveness and the level of discussion at the PWGs, progress is being made in terms of quality & depth of discussion and representation (although variations exist between pillars). However, significant lack of consistency was noted in a number of aspects critical to the success of the PWG meetings. Inconsistent attendance by members, a lack of forward-looking agendas, minutes didn't provide meaningful details and limited follow-up on action points all constituted serious shortcomings. In the beginning, the PWGs started as one-day events, but due to lengthy agendas and competing priorities for different sub groups, it was decided that sub working groups meet one day before the PWG meeting to ensure their outcomes informed the agenda of the PWG. The review team did not find clear evidence to show that annual work plans were being used to inform discussions, planning and monitoring of progress, as some did not even have a workplan until later in 2017 or early 2018. The extent to which ministerial work plans were used to inform PWG annual work plans is also unclear. In fact, in the joint annual review of 2017 found that out of the 26 ministries only 18 ministries had even shared their work plans with MoPIED. It was also noted during data collection that a majority of the line ministry staff were not versed with their own ministry's targets, indicators, milestones and interventions as stipulated in the NDP. This may be due to new staff who were not oriented on the NDP and, lack of consultation and perhaps inadequate communication in the ministries. This therefore shows that most line ministries do not use the NDP as the primary guide for designing and implementing projects and programs.

3. PERFORMANCE BY KEY INSTITUTIONS

All the public and private institutions have a part to play in the successful implementation of the National Development Plan. From the parliament, office of the prime minister, to the line ministries at FGS and FMSs and the International Development partners, the primary stakeholders are responsible for one aspect of the NDP or another. Some of them have taken their roles seriously while others can easily trace their work in the National Development Plan, simply because it broad enough for every institution to see their work in one pillar of the NDP or another despite the limited conscious efforts.

3.1 Parliament

Somalia parliament carried out her legislative, representative, and oversight functions all of which indirectly contribute to the NDP. The Media Bill, Foreign Investment Bill, Procurement Bill, Anti-Money Laundering Bill, Telecommunication Bill were all passed by the Federal Parliament of Somalia⁵. They were also active in budget Scrutiny and monitoring government expenditure federal budget to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of public funds and development assistance during this period.

However, none of these actions were deliberately in direct reference to a specific benchmark provided for in the national development plan. This was in part, due to the fact there were little if any budget that was assigned to development projects under the NDP through the federal government budget. The Fiscal budget of the 2017/2018 which were approved by the parliament consisted largely of wage bills and little if any, funding for development projects. Considerable proportion of the funding for humanitarian and development projects went to through the international development partners with which the parliament had no interactions.

3.2 Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)

The office of the prime Minister is responsible for the coordination of government policies and programmes in the country. in the NDP, the OPM bears the responsibility of Informing all the key stakeholders and the public of NDP goals, progress and facilitate public participation through frequent policy dialogues forums for relevant stakeholders to support planning and effective service delivery. While the OPM through the aid coordination and delivery units interact with key stakeholders and the public through coordination forums and the media, the MTR did not find evidence of tangible efforts, including routine platforms, aimed at: increasing public awareness of and participation in the NDP or providing periodic updates on the progress towards its goals. The review team was also unable to trace signs of consistent publications on the NDP either by the delivery unit or from MoPIED and line ministries to or by the OPM.

The office of the Prime Minister has, however, made significant strides in steering the government programmes and coordination of aid architecture around the NDP in a manner that is mutually accountable enforcing adherence to the principles of partnerships agreed by federal government of Somalia and the international Community at the SPF conference held in London in May 2017, as discussed below.

3.2.1 3.2.1 Mutual accountability framework,

During the SPF submit held in London in May 2017, International donors committed to providing predictable, robust and flexible financing for Somalia's development. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on its part, committed to meeting its political, governance, economic and financial commitments in a timely manner. In order to operationalize these commitments, the parties agreed to monitor the commitments of the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) through an annually revised Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF).

Somalia's MAF was developed in the form of a scorecard providing light-touch, updates of progress against the mutual undertakings that drive the NPS agreement. The Somalia Development Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) Steering Committee leads the management of this score taking, supported by the Monitoring and Evaluation functions of


⁵ <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/FactSheet-Somalia-SSG-October-2017.pdf>

Government. Whereas reporting was initially planned to be quarterly, the MAF has only been reported against twice, at the SPF in Mogadishu in December 2017 and at the SPF in Brussels in July 2018. The review of the 2018 MAF benchmarks is currently underway but has yet to be finalized. Benchmarks for a 2019 MAF have yet to be identified and agreed.

The milestones in the first two iterations – for 2017 and 2018 – of the Somalia MAF are derived from Pillar Working Groups, lead ministries and ongoing commitments. It was designed to complement more detailed reporting through the NDP monitoring and evaluation framework. The MAF consists of two ‘scorecard tables A and B. Table A, contains shared Goals and Objectives which sets high level milestones, focused on critical issues, which will provide an overview of the direction the national development is headed and a tool to guide more strategic conversations at the SDRF. Table B on the other hand, provides information on Partnership Principles and Enabling Actions, which monitors the performance of not only the international community in meeting their commitments on how they deliver aid, but also government’s progress in effecting the systems and reforms needed to enable them. There had been plans in a future iteration of the MAF to develop a third table which summarizes high level results reporting from the NDP M&E Framework.

As several milestones were still in progress at the close of the year, they were still being tracked until their achievement in 2018. While the detailed status of the MAF is attached an appendix at the end of the report, the following highlights status as of June 2018, as completed by the relevant PWGs.

Figure 3: MAF - Status of MAF - Shared goals & objectives, June 2018




Source: MOPIED

3.2.2 Partnership principles

International partners endeavored to align their programs behind the NDP which sets the priorities for national recovery and development. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on its part, committed to taking lead in setting the national priorities through the NDP for purposes of guiding international partners’ planning, coordination, resource mobilisation and delivery of development assistance, in full collaboration with the FGS and FMSs.

Figure 4: Status of MAF - Partnership principles, June 2018



Source: MOPIED

Regarding the extent to which aid is being channelled through government, Ministry of Finance records show steady progress have been made with regards to the proportion of the development aid that is going through the FGS Treasury Single Account. The share of aid delivered through treasury increased significantly to US \$100 million in 2017 (approximately 14% of development aid), a leap from the US \$55.3 million delivered in 2016 (approximately 8% of development aid). However, this number still falls short of the 15% target set in the UCS Roadmap (see pages 9-10 of the Aid Flows report for more details).⁶

However, there remains significant resource imbalance between the government and development partners. The government officials interviewed, argue that development in Somalia remains a donor-led for as long as donors continue to finance projects, primarily based their own priorities, which may at times conflict with the priorities of the Somali people. On the other hand, the review noted that most NDP sectors and government departments rarely have costed, prioritized NDP activities. Instead there were a long list of activities to be undertaken, without clear linkages to the NDP goals. The review also noted, there was no active engagement with FMS on implementing the NDP, nor was there a proactive engagement strategy with civil society.

Similarly, asked whether development aid is delivered in partnership with government institutions and whether the development aid addresses the most pressing government priorities, respondents were unison in their reservation, citing limited involvement by the government in majority of donor funded development programs. They asserted that vast majority of the development funded programs are preconceived, independently designed and management largely without government involvement. As a result, almost rules out the opportunity to hold each other accountable.

In terms of alignment of aid behind the NDP priorities, many partners were found riding on the assumption that the NDP is broad enough to accommodate any form of development activity, without the need to revise the original project design. The inability to substantively assess alignment is due largely to the broad scope of the NDP's priorities which remain un-costed. The requirement to have all development partners to align their interventions with Somalia's NDP (2017-2019) is paying off. One of the major donors (the European Union) places a clear requirement for present or potential partners to align their projects with the NDP goals. Quite a few NGO consortiums implementing large scale projects have revised their projects accordingly. Although the review team have not had the opportunity to meet all of them, the Somali Resilience programme (SOMREP) was one such consortiums who provided documentation to show alignment. Many other NGOs were however, of the view that their projects are [consciously and subconsciously] associable with the NDP and therefore, did not see the need to revise their project in line with the NDP format. They believe their programs work towards improve the lives of the Somali people and that was the ultimate test of success in the NDP.

⁶ <http://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Aid-Flows-in-Somalia-2018-English-1.pdf>

3.2.3 Aid Information Management System (AIMS),

The government has developed an innovative Aid Information Management System (AIMS), which draws on the recommendations of the aid information management review conducted in 2015. The AIMS has not yet been rolled out and until this is achieved the directorate is burdened with undertaking this major function through a manual process. Additionally, the ministries, as potential users of this system, reported not having their own progress tracking systems and are eager to see the MoPIED AIMS up and running. The data that is reported through the annual aid mapping exercise remains under-utilized due to limited awareness of the available data (even within MoPIED) and the lack of user-friendly tools to access and analyse the data. The AIMS should help remedy some of these shortcomings.

3.3 Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED)

MoPIED, provides operational leadership of the NDP across Federal Government Institutions and ensures proper coordination and oversight of NDP execution. The Ministry was also expected to: (a) prepare a short- and medium-term results-oriented comprehensive and integrated development plans for the country; (b) Report to Cabinet periodically on Government performance and results including spending; (c) Support local capacity development for national planning, and guidance to the national and local bodies responsible for the decentralized planning process (d) Study and publish independent assessments of key economic and social policy issues and options so as to increase public understanding and participation; Prepare Government's Annual Performance Report with data and evidence on progress towards national development plan objectives. To achieve these responsibilities, MoPIED has established and operationalised Monitoring and Evaluation and National Statistics functions.

3.3.1 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting

Based on lessons from the Compact, the NDP proposed a National Comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation framework to monitor implementation and evaluate impact. MoPIED's monitoring & evaluation directorate achieved a number of milestones that lay the foundation for the directorate's expansive national monitoring role. In this regard, the monitoring and evaluation directorate developed a national M&E framework and is in the process of the drafting an M&E policy, to be tabled in the parliament in July 2018.

In terms of tracking results, currently there is no system in place to report and track indicators related to NDP results. While there are many monitoring activities at the project level in Somalia, there is a dearth of nationally represented statistics. Efforts to collect data on results from implementing partners have not yielded useful results. Interviews with NGOs revealed that while they are required to submit quarterly and annual reports, there are no requirements for tracking and reporting on the NDP interventions, targets and indicators. Furthermore, there is no feedback and follow up on the reports once submitted and therefore, the reporting is seen as just another routine exercise to satisfy a bureaucratic requirement. Monitoring, evaluations and quality assurance capacities are very low at the directorate; therefore, it is not surprising that there is no feedback on reports, no critical review of the work plans and no evidence of meaningful engagement with the partners. The monitoring and evaluation capacities are even weaker within the line ministries and the FMS.

However, the monitoring and evaluation directorate has demonstrated achievements in other areas including; the joint annual review, the aid mapping exercise (which gathered data from partners about 800 projects), and the production of capacity building models for FGS and FMS line ministries. The review couldn't verify the impact of the capacity building training and whether or not it was established using a needs assessment guideline. There was also no evidence of an outcome evaluation and/or a mechanism for follow-up, especially with the FMS. The NDP outlines clear performance reviews for the duration of the plan. There are 3 major reviews envisaged by the NDP and they are; quarterly reviews, bi-annual reviews and annual joint reviews. The review team couldn't locate any evidence of a quarterly and/or bi-annual review during the MTR; however, as previously mentioned, a joint annual review was conducted by MoPIED.

Similarly, the review of the evaluation role of the government reveals that performance is a mix. The NDP placed a requirement on all projects above \$1 million USD, to be subject to rigorous evaluation or value for money. In practice, there are some requirements in place for such projects, especially baselines and end-lines evaluations. It is not clear if the evaluations are driven by government requirements or as part of the donor requirement, since most donors require evaluations to be embedded in the projects they fund. The review did not reveal any projects that were subjected to

value for money scrutiny, whether implemented by government or non-governmental organizations. The MoPIED and FMS monitoring and evaluation departments don't have standard evaluations guidelines, but the recent adoption of a national evaluation strategy and framework if rolled out, could fill the current gap. For projects implemented by NGOs and UN agencies, MoPIED's role is peripheral, as the evaluation designs and management are normally led by the implementing agency and externally commissioned to independent consultants. This despite the fact that MoPIED has a monitoring and evaluation framework, which functions to track the effectiveness and impact of development programs and the performance of the economy. With regard to strategies; all FMS have drafted their state strategic development plan, the new statistics law is under a parliamentary approval process and a draft National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS) strategy has been developed and is under review. Furthermore, the 2nd Somali High Frequency Survey for poverty analysis has been conducted and a dedicated effort is ongoing for population estimates.

While the above actions and activities demonstrate some progress, it's the review team's appraisal that the monitoring and evaluation directorate is the centrepiece to the implementation of the NDP and therefore, the above achievements fall short of their targets, given their infancy against the time lapse. It is critical to review the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the government, across all the ministries, and in particular those ministries and departments assigned to undertake the M&E of development programs and the performance of the economy, such as MoPIED. To this end, an important step is to close the capacity gap between the M&E mechanisms of the government, the M&E mechanisms of implementing partners such as NGOs and UN agencies, in order for the government to be effective in exercising oversight.

3.3.2 M&E Management Information Systems

MoPIED acquired the Management Information Systems (MIS) in support of the NDP in March 2018. It is an integrated database designed to assist to track the projects and programs that are implemented across the country. although presently operated sub-optimally, the system has the capacity store all relevant data related to development project, including the details of: the project, implementing partners sources of fund, locations, beneficiary characteristics (e.g. gender and age disaggregated information) and duration among others information.

Such information enables the M&E directorate to choose what project and when to monitor or evaluate. Although not developed at the time of report, the system provides for separate portals for each for line ministries that can aggregate and transmit information about the NDP related plans, monitoring, evaluation and reporting information to MoPIED management systems dashboard, enabling the M&E directorate to prioritize fund allocation to various regions and district of the country based on the varying levels needs and vulnerabilities identified at the overall appeal or specific needs assessment stages of the projects; tracking, monitor, performance evaluate and reporting on project/programme effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact and its wider contribution and the progress towards the national development plan (NDP) goals and various level indicators.

At the time of the MTR, there were more than 700 development projects stored in the systems and NDP related workplans of 18-line ministries. The M&E team and MoPIED have access to the information, but the directorate has no fixed plan for either monitoring or the financial or manpower capacity to carry out proper monitoring of project. At the time of the MTR the directorate was in the process of drafting an M&E policy that will address M&E requirements on all (public, private) entities, managing public resources; frequencies and resources gaps.

3.3.3 National Statistics

With support from the World bank the National Statistics directorates is increasingly assuming overall responsibility for the professional integrity and statistical quality of all outputs by the FGS. Although it has a long way to go, the directorate began to produce and disseminate harmonization statistical information that will provide firm evidence base for sound decisions, effective government policies and management of public service delivery particularly in the sectors of economics, education and Health. The ongoing economic data collection including the routine Commodity Price Index (CPI) particularly in Banadir, the directorate will be able to inform in limited way, the direction of economic and commercial activities main Mogadishu for now.

3.4 Ministry of Finance (MoF)

Core responsibilities of MoF, under the NDP include: (a) organizes strategic dialogue around financing architecture for implementing the NDP; (b) Coordination with international financial institutions and Government representatives on Trust Fund Management with input from MOPIEC; (c) Recording and report budget- support inflows, including aid in-kind; (d) Releasing of timely and quality information on budget execution; and Prepare annual medium- term expenditure framework (MTEF) consistent with the NDP/iPRSP in cooperation with MoPIED, line- ministries and agencies.

While MoF achieved very little in relation to securing sufficient finances for the NDP implementation through the government budget, the ministry made significant progress winning the trust of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral creditors to be able to help finance its development programme in the long run. The FGS met the requirements of the second phase of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) Staff Monitored Program (SMP), and is enthusiastic to deliver on the more demanding requirements of the third SMP. If Somalia delivers on the third SMP and re-establishes the trust of its creditors, there is a huge potential for the country to acquire finances for major national projects such as infrastructure, which is an important impetus to spurring economic growth. However, the review took note of the fact that the IMF process is normally iterative and continuously develops, which get strenuous as it advances. Moreover, the SMP is just one part of the process. The government will need to secure commitments from donors to finance debt relief. As such, it is critical for the government to maintain rigor, precision and the zeal to sustain the gains made thus far, while pressing forward and accelerating to deliver on the remaining requirements to demonstrate good financial management- a precursor for trust and confidence in the system. This is critical as access to external financing is dependent on Somalia clearing the nearly US\$ 4.7 billion in external debt to multilateral and bilateral creditors.⁷

The review noted, a heightened push for Somalia's debt relief by the FGS and civil society. This debt relief is vital to sustain the push to establish greater opportunities for new financing strategies in supporting the reconstruction and development of Somalia. Discussions on the full cancellation of debt would go a long way to utilize external financing programs and projects that are essential for Somalia's development, as opposed to diverting scarce resources from development to servicing external debts.

Progress has also been realized through government contributions, which enable the government to cover its expenses through its own coffers.

There has been a marked improvement in increasing domestic revenue mobilisation, albeit from a low base, increasing the government's ability to finance a higher proportion of development programmes. According to the World Bank economic update-3 for Somalia, revenues increased from \$113 million in 2016 to \$143 million in 2017 to \$42 million in the first quarter of 2018. This progress is notable if it is sustained and expenditure is maintained at a manageable level through 2018 and 2019. The implementation of an improved fiscal policy was driven by the broadening of the tax base through customs reforms and other domestic revenue mobilisation. These includes a new sales tax on goods and services and an enhanced compliance system resulting from the operationalization of the large and-medium-taxpayers' office, established in June 2018.

3.5 Development Partners (DPs)

The core responsibilities of the International Development Partners to the NDP mainly include: Assisting the Government efforts through financial, technical and other forms of assistance to strengthen its performance; Provide an external perspective on Government performance and results; Provide feedback to domestic and international constituencies on Government performance and results.

Somalia continues to depend highly on foreign aid and remittances from the diaspora populations, given the low levels of foreign direct investment and domestic revenue. Aid to Somalia reached a record high in 2017. Reported Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Somalia amounted to US \$1.75 billion for 2017. This marks a 41% increase

⁷ <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/02/26/Somalia-First-Review-Under-the-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46633>

compared with the past three years of aid flows, which averaged US \$1.24 billion per year. There was an ODA to GDP ratio of nearly 26%⁸ a slight increase from previous year which was 21%. The increase in ODA was mainly as a result of the surge in the drought response in 2017.⁹

In 2017, Somalia averted a looming famine and the success in preventing the disaster is largely attributed to the lessons learned from the 2011 famine. A key attribution is the enhanced coordination efforts across the board, but in particular the efforts of the government. The government has made progress in clarifying and strengthening structures in disaster management, resilience and recovery. MoHADM has provided the much-needed leadership in coordinating, guiding and directing the response. MoHADM successfully pushed for the approval of the national disaster management policy. The policy lays a solid legal framework for the ministry and clarifies roles and responsibilities, which in past were sources of confusion and conflict among various departments and agencies. With the policy approved, the challenge the ministry is facing is that there is no budget allocation for the roll out and implementation of the policy in the FMS and Banadir Regional Administration (BRA). Additionally, it is critical to adopt & fast-track any relevant FGS commitments, policy and/or legislative agenda on; displacement and durable solutions, national eviction guidelines, refugee-returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) protocols, housing, land, and property interim and time specific protocols and a refugee act.

Development aid to Somalia also continues to be stable, despite the slight decline seen in 2017, which may be attributed to: the falling value of several donor currencies relative to the United States Dollar; the diversion of funds to humanitarian activities in response to the drought; and the late reporting of the 2017 forward projections. Development envelopes are more predictable with multi-year funding cycles, which have increasingly been the preferred approach among Somalia's major traditional donors in the recent years. Considering the trend, it's also less likely to increase significantly from the currently reported levels.

3.6 Line Ministries

Although there is an ongoing effort, majority of the line ministries are generally struggling in the development of sector policies, strategies and guidelines in line with the NDP. Many of them have developed costed annual work plans in line with the objectives, milestones and targets set in the NDP and shared with MoPIED, but that pretty much remains a paper work. There is limited resources channelled through MoPIED and in some degree, to line ministries directly by some of the UN (notably UNICEF and UNDP) and other development partners for capacitating them to effectively plan, monitor and report on their progress towards the NDP goals, but there has been limited result in terms of maintaining a "Implementation Tracking Plan" for review, evaluation recommendations, agreed follow-up actions, and status of these actions. The review team have not come across any line Ministry with complete and approved M&E reports available to the public in a timely manner.

3.7 Federal Member States

Due to severe access, time and logistical and limitation, the review team have not physically accessed the three federal Member states. Though our visits to Jubbaland and Southwest, MTR can report that states are making some efforts to operationalise the NDP. To start with, all State Governments have Ministries in Charge of Planning, Statistics, Monitoring and Evaluation Functions. The extent to which the NDP was used as the development guide by the FMS is indistinct. Albeit reports of inconsistency, FMS representatives (mainly junior staff) attended the SDRF/NDC. MTR team come across one or more-member states, who have state strategic plans that they claim are in alignment with the NDP. For example, Jubbaland and Southwest State have both confirmed having in place a strategic plan that is in alignment with the NDP. The review team couldn't also ascertain the existence of strong governmental and PWG engagements with FMS on the NDP. None of them however, have effectively operationalised it or produced annual performance reports in line with the objectives and targets of the NDP and the corresponding State Development Plans.

⁸ March 2018, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, Aid flows in Somalia, an analysis of aid flow data

⁹ <http://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Aid-Flows-in-Somalia-2018-English-1.pdf>

The review however, noted variations among the FMS with regard to capacities of the institutions. For instance, Puntland State is much more advanced in establishing developmental plans in comparison to their counterparts and even the FGS. The supervision, regulation and control of the FGS institutional mandate to provide technical oversight in order to achieve the objectives of the NDP over the FMS is weak. The MTR team have also noted a clear lack of reliable M&E findings on the parts of both the FGS and FMS levels. This have considerably reduced the ability of the FMS to inform their development programme, policy, and resource allocation decisions.

3.8 Office of the Auditor General

While the office of the Audits General (AG) has general mandate to which the office perform consistently, the MTR has not been able to assess any report on public accounts about public offices including public corporation or other bodies. Neither were there evidence of any specific NDP driven effort to conducts financial, value for money and other audits, in respect of any NDP related project or activity involving public funds.

4. PROGRESS TOWARDS KEY DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS & THEIR ALIGNMENT TO THE SDGS

4.1 Social & Human Development Pillar

4.1.1 Health

The goal of the health sector in the NDP is to improve the quality of life through improved accessibility to quality health services; thereby preventing and controlling communicable and non-communicable diseases and reducing maternal and childhood mortalities.

The social and human development pillar identified six goals overall and fourteen targets specific to the health and nutrition sector through its vision: *all people in Somalia enjoy the highest possible health status.*

Besides reviewing the progress made on the indicators, the MTR also collected information on the interventions, processes and procedures that the ministry and other partners were undertaking that ultimately contributes to the achievements of the NDP targets. While some progress has been realized by the sector, for the most part, targets are largely off track and at best some of the interventions are at preliminary - discussion and consultation stages at the ministry and/or at the pillar working groups level. The review is also being conducted against the backdrop of the yet to be conducted DHS and 2017 drought, which largely affected the populations living in the south and central parts of the country.

During the review period, the demographic health survey 2018 was been planned, when completed the DHS will contribute to providing updated and reliable data on health and the population. Overall there is a major challenge in obtaining data due to lack of a fully functional statistical unit and an effective national archive where data can be obtained easily and on time. That said, out of the nine indicators in the health sector, the review gathered data for 6 indicators from various sources including reports from development and implementing partners. There is a modest improvement in the Pent 3 coverage rate to 53%, up from a baseline of 43%. Similarly, progress in the reduction of HIV incidence and improvement in fertility has been noted as shown in Table 1 below. The MTR also collected some of the missing baseline data for example, the tuberculosis and malaria incidence- 27/1000 and 85.5/1000 respectively.

Table 1: Health sector - Progress on indicators

- Source: Ministries and documents

Indicator	Baseline 2016	Target 2019	Updated Data	Alignment with SDGs
1. Maternal Mortality Ratio	732/100000	600/100000	Unavailable	3.1.1 Maternal mortality ratio
2. Under-five mortality rate	137/1000	<100/1000	Unavailable	3.2.1 Under-five mortality rate
3. Total fertility rate	6.7	6	6.27	No
4. Contraceptive prevalence rate	6%	>15%	No	No
5. HIV/AIDS incidence	1%	<1%	0.04 ¹⁰	3.3.1 Number of new HIV infections per 1,000 uninfected population
6. Tuberculosis incidence per 1,000 population			270/100,000 ¹¹	3.3.2 Tuberculosis incidence per 1,000 population
7. Malaria incidence per 1,000 population			85.5/1000 ¹²	3.3.3 Malaria incidence per 1,000 population
8. Pent 3 coverage rate for 1 year	46%	70%	53%	No
9. Proportion of births attended by Skilled birth attendants	33%	55%	33%	3.1.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

¹⁰ UNAIDS DATA 2018

¹¹https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=/WHO_HQ_Reports/G2/PROD/EXT/TBCountryProfile&ISO2=SO&outtype=html

¹² WHO 2015

The MTR observes that the drought of 2017 may have contributed to the deterioration in health indicators in the country, by putting a strain on household food and nutrition situation and also stretching the capacity/ability of humanitarian and development agencies to alleviate the effects of the drought. Though a famine was averted, the drought resulted in significant displacement across the country. With limited social services infrastructure especially in terms of potable water supply and shelter, the people living in the south and central parts of the country were most affected and largely depended on humanitarian assistance for their food consumption and basic needs.

The rollout of the health sector strategy, 2017-2020, has been slow. At the time of the assessment, the ministry was finalizing the health sector strategy and consultation with key stakeholders were underway. This process may provide an opportunity to align the health sector strategy with the national development plan and conduct the implementation and work plans concurrently. There are also opportunities for conjunction with new projects such as, the CHASP Project-Health infrastructure plan (which will be in covering 71 health facilities across 10 districts), which can aid the NDP implementation;

Although the review was not able to verify this, the health sector maintains that quality health services were provided through the framework of the Somalia Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS). For example, the sector is serving the same 9 regions (out of a total of 18 regions), that were being served before the NDP under review. That said, the main progress in the health sector during the review period reflects the successful response and prevention of outbreaks. The response, which was done with the help of development partners, has contributed to the reduction in mortality and morbidity from cholera, measles and other communicable diseases, as well as the maintenance of a polio free status in the country for three years.

The review has established that the health sector has already developed a multi-year country plan for immunization coverage and that the National Immunization Policy is under review, while it also envisages to develop an immunization act. The measles campaign conducted in all zones from January to March, 2018 covered 93% of the population and there is a noticeable decline in cases following the mass campaign. There were 6,255 cumulative cases of suspected measles cases in the beginning of 2018, compared to over 15,000 reported the same period last year (MOH & WHO 2018)¹³. In addition, the five-year Measles control and planning strategy workshop was conducted in May 2018. On integrated disease surveillance, the ministry with the assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) identified and enrolled 341 health facilities and about 260 (83%) of these facilities currently submit reports regularly into the Early Warning Alert & Response Network (EWARN).

With regard to the NDP intervention of increasing health coverage, a consultation meeting was held in April 2018 with key health stakeholders from other East African nations, who have shared their experience on universal health care. In the area of non-communicable diseases there is an on-going survey to understand the magnitude and prevalence in the country and results are expected to be released in the near future. Maternal and child health is among the priority program areas and a technical workshop was conducted in August 2018, whereby a strategic plan was developed to address the gaps, improve the quality of services, and reduce mortality and morbidity.

The Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) microplanning exercise for a Global Vaccine Alliance (GAVI) in Health Strengthening System (HSS) districts is ongoing in all zones and joint appraisal for immunization was conducted with all stakeholders in August, 2018. The burden of malaria has reduced drastically as a result of multiple interventions (e.g. case management, malaria prevention and advocacy & BCC), which were undertaken by WHO, in partnership with the leadership of the Ministry of Health. The malaria program completed in 2017 and the preliminary results of the second MIS 2017 show that there was only a 1.9% prevalence of malaria, confirming the reduction of the disease.

¹³ <http://www.emro.who.int/som/somalia-news/huge-measles-campaign-in-drought-hit-somalia-aims-to-protect-children-and-save-lives.html>

The sector envisaged an assessment and mapping of the health infrastructure and the development of a long-term masterplan for health infrastructure development and effective service delivery. While the assessment was completed in 2016, the development of the health infrastructure masterplan hasn't been achieved due to funding constraints.

4.1.2 Nutrition

The sector has identified 7 targets that would be achieved through a set of 3 broad intervention milestones. The 3 broad intervention milestones are: providing essential nutrition services with a focus on children, women and other vulnerable communities; providing robust nutrition information and supporting operational research; and supporting institutional development for the effective and sustainable delivery of essential nutrition services.

The MTR reviewed the targets and their performance in the review period. Similar to the Health sector, the DHS data would have provided information on nutrition, but the survey has not been completed. The MTR could not also find reliable countrywide data from the ministry or development partners to determine progress. Out of the 5 target indicators, the review only access data for one indicator-prevalence of wasting (Table 2). In addition, the micronutrient survey is expected to provide additional nutrition data once the survey results are available. Nonetheless, the MTR reviewed progress in terms of interventions, milestones and processes that the sector has undertaken with the aim of ultimately achieving the targets in the NDP.

Table 2: Nutrition - Progress on Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2016	Target 2019	Updated Data	Alignment with SDGs
10. 1. Prevalence of stunting in Children age 0-59 months	12%	<9%	No	2.2.1 Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age
11. 2. Prevalence of wasting	13%	<10%	13.9 14.4% ¹⁴	2.2.2 Prevalence of malnutrition by type (wasting and overweight)
12. 3. Prevalence of under-weight Children age 0-59 months	13.40%	<10%	No	Prevalence of malnutrition (weight for height < 5 years of age)
13. 4. Exclusive breastfeeding rate	33%	50%	No	
14. 5. Prevalence of anemia among pregnant women	49%	<30%	No	

Major initiatives which are critical enablers for NDP target achievements are ongoing and include: Somaliland joining the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN), with the secretariat located in the office of the Vice President; micronutrient surveys, which will provide program data on “hidden hunger”; the completion of the human resource capacity development strategy for the nutrition workforce; the development of the food fortification strategy; the creation of several SUN networks, which is led by the Somali National University and which includes members from academia, the UN, civil society and the private sector; and the development of the Social Mobilization and Communication Strategy (SMAC). Plans to integrate nutrition in the education curriculum are ongoing and the development of a comprehensive nutrition strategy, which is consistent with the common results framework of the NDP and SDG, is underway.

4.1.3 Education

The education sector has 12 NDP milestones and interventions, in addition to 5 indicators which it plans to accomplish through its vision of, *Fulfil the right of every Somali to education and build an adequate, well educated, better skilled and competent workforce that contributes to the economic and human development of the nation.*

Out of the total 5 target indicators, the review was able to obtain data for 4 indicators. However, it is challenging to make a determination of the progress based on the information available to the MTR, because out of the 5 indicators, only 3 have a baseline set in the NDP. Secondly, there are inconsistencies in some baseline figures between what is given in the NDP document and that from the Ministry, namely the gross enrolment rates (GER) for primary and secondary education are 30% and 26% (in 2016), yet the GER information obtained from the ministry for 2018 is a much lower percentage of 21% and 18% respectively. That said, the review reveals modest increase in public financing

¹⁴ Quarterly Brief – FSNAU & FEWS NET June-July 2018.

of the education sector from a baseline (2016) of 3% of total government budget to 4.3% in 2018; this is trailing far below the 2019 target of 12% (See Table 3).

Table 3: Education Sector - Progress on Indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDG alignment
1. Gross enrolment ratio in primary education	30%	45%	21% ¹⁵	4.1.1 Proportion of children(a) in grades 2/3
2. Gross enrolment ratio in secondary schools	26%	35%	18%	4.1.1 Proportion of young people: (c) at the end of lower secondary
3. % of primary school teachers certified (trained) to teach according to national standard		30%	36%	4.c.1 Proportion of teachers in primary and secondary education who have received minimum organized training
4. Literacy rate adult male and female				4.b.1 Volume of official development assistance flows for scholarships
5. % of public spending in education as total of government budget	3%	12%	4.3%	4.6.1 Percentage of population achieving a fixed level of (a) literacy

Source: Ministries and documents

While the education sector experienced some progress in increased public financing, the ministry reported that it faces protracted challenges around financing. While the NDP envisioned that the government would increase budget allocation to the education sector by 3% annually, the sector's finances continue to rely largely on external funding. The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 2018-2020, projects off-budget donor support for the ESSP 2018-2020, of about US \$150 million, while domestic financing from the national budget is projected at US \$44.7 million; this demonstrates an overreliance on donor funding for the coming years.

Despite the extraordinary challenges that Somalia faces, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education (MoECHE), has completed some action points that will help the NDP in achieving its milestones. These are: the completion of the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP); the launch of a new education curriculum for primary schools across the country; the administration of national examinations across Somalia; and the successful conduct of the Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES) in Mogadishu. Somalia has one of the world's lowest gross enrolment rates for primary school-aged children, at only 32%, while secondary enrolment remains low at 15.8%. The 2015/16 GER indicated a six-point difference between GER for boys and girls, standing at 35.2% for boys and 28.9% for girls. (ESSP, 2018-2020).

The 3-year Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) covers all education sub-sectors, from early childhood education to higher education, and incorporates factors for strengthening the resilience of communities against shocks and disasters. The plan is guided by: The NDP 2017-2019; The Draft Education Act of 2017; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) treaty; the International Safe Schools Declaration; and other key national and international policy instruments such as the global targets for SDG 4. All the 5 indicators education indicators are aligned with the NDP. Additionally, MOECHE has launched a new education curriculum for primary schools across the country to ensure access to quality education

The fourth Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES) was conducted in Mogadishu in July 2018, with the participation from all the Federal Members States and the theme was, 'Strengthening the Education System to deliver Equitable Quality Education Service'. The government has vowed to make quality education a priority in their overall implementation plan and has pledged to work with the Ministry of Finance in securing and increasing the budget for education.

While some of the above actions, such as the completion of the ESSP, lay the groundwork for achieving the NDP targets; at the time of review, the ministry of education has largely not met the 5 targets set out in the NDP, except the one on “percent of teachers certified (trained) to teach according to national standard” where the NDP final target of 30% has already been exceeded. Whereas there is slow progress to achieving the targets, there is also a main challenge of lack of data; for example, the ministry did not collect the gross enrolment ratio data for primary and secondary schools for this year and the previous academic year (2017 & 2018). The available data from 2016 shows

¹⁵ Data based on ESSP 2018-2020.

inconsistencies because, while the NDP GER baseline (2016) for primary and secondary was set as 30% and 26%, the ESSP 2018-2020 and other sources put the baseline (2017) data at 32% and 15.8%. The unreliability of baseline data makes it difficult to determine progress; nonetheless, the MTR determines that the education targets are largely still unmet.

4.1.4 Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH)

The NDP for the WASH sector, includes a plan to increase the number of people with access to clean water from a baseline of 35% in 2016, to 60% by the end of 2019. With regard to sanitation, the NDP plans to increase the number of people living in an open defecation free (ODF) environment by 40%. The NDP sets 6 targets for the WASH cluster, which are to be achieved between 2017-2019. To achieve the WASH targets, there are 6 interventions and milestones laid out by the NDP. These interventions and milestones include; supporting the government in establishing the policy and legal framework to govern the provision of water supply in the country, the creation of sustainable sanitation and hygiene services; and sustainable financing strategies for WASH.

The sector made some significant progress in 2 out of the six indicators in the NDP. The percentage of people using clean water improved from a baseline of 35% to 40%. Similarly, the percentage of population using safely managed sanitation services including a hand-washing with soap and water increased from 10% to 14% as reported by the WHO and UNICEF joint monitoring report. For percentage of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary schools provided with basic drinking water and basic sanitation, there was no baseline information, however, the review gathered data from the WHO/UNICEF 2017, joint monitoring program for water and sanitation that 38% and 40% for water and sanitation respectively (Table 4)

Table 4: Water and sanitation - Progress on indicators

Indicators	Baseline 2016	Target 2019	Updated Data	SDG alignment
1. % of population using clean water	35%	60%	40% ¹⁶	6.1.1 Proportion of population using safe drinking water services
2. % of the population using safely managed sanitation services including a hand-washing facility with a soap and water	10%	50%	14%	6.2.1 Proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services, including a hand-washing facility
3. % of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary schools providing basic drinking water and basic sanitation		50%	38% for water supply 40% for Sanitation ¹⁷	4.a.1 Proportion of schools with access to: (e) basic drinking water; (f) basic sanitation facilities
4. % of people living in open defecation free communities;		40%	Unavailable	No
5. Proportion of urban solid waste regularly collected and with adequately disposed in big cities			Unavailable	11.6.1 Proportion of urban solid waste regularly collected and with adequate final discharge out of

Source: Ministry and documents

Furthermore, there has been some nascent progress with regard to the development of strategies, policies and a legal framework. For instance, a water draft policy has been finalized and is awaiting cabinet approval; while a WASH policy, strategic plan and M&E framework have already been developed.

On the finance side, the WASH sector has benefited from bilateral funding such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF). The first two projects – “Improving Access to Water and Sanitation Services in Somalia” and “Strengthening Institutions for Public Works” – were approved in December 2016 through to 2020 and have already made good progress in the WASH sector. Unfortunately, funding for sustainable WASH strategies continue to remain a challenge as aid flows to Somalia are currently prioritized towards short term

¹⁶ Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 2017 Report
Who/Unicef joint monitoring programme for water supply, sanitation and hygiene

¹⁷ Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene in schools global baseline report 2018

imperatives due to the recent droughts and emergencies. This is compounded by no or limited capital expenditure allocation from the government of Somalia, leaving WASH and other infrastructure-like projects as the least funded pillars of the NDP priorities.

The WASH sector also made some progress on the construction and upgrading of sustainable water supply systems by development and humanitarian partners, which resulted in increased water supply coverage to 40% by 2017 (JMP 2017 Report). As previously noted, a national water law has been drafted and is awaiting the cabinet’s approval. Plans are also underway to develop a national water policy and an energy master plan and national policy. Other initiatives include; the Somali Electrification Institute study – a study that will inform the FGS and interested partners on the initial institutional steps that will be required to accelerate the development and formalization of the energy sector. There is either no progress or limited progress was noted on the other targets. For instance, progress was not reported on sustainable sanitation nor on increasing people living in open defecation free (ODF) communities.

On developing “a well-established information management system and data collection”, not much progress has been made in the sector; the different organizations working within the WASH sector continue to use f ad-hoc data collection, analysis and information management approaches. This has critically hindered the ability to gather and access data for measuring progress on NDP and other national and global targets in the WASH sector. As a result, the MTR has determined that progress on the NDP targets for the WASH sector are largely indeterminate or off-track.

4.1.5 Labour & Employment

The NDP spells out 3 interventions and milestones to achieve the 16 targets under labour and employment. Somalia has a high unemployment rate and the International Labour Organization (ILO 2016) estimates the employment to population ratio for Somalia to be at 46% up from a baseline (2016) of 39% (Table 5). The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), has requested that the UN Joint Program on Youth Employment and ILO design of a comprehensive National Employment Strategy (NES). Preliminary work on NES has started through consultation with key stakeholders. Furthermore, a national Labour force survey on employment and skills is being initiated and an action plan of immediate interventions on the same has been developed.

Table 5: Labor and employment - Progress on indicators

Indicators	Baseline 2016	Target 2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. Employment to population ratio	39%	50%	46.1% ¹⁸	8.5.2 Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities
2. Distribution of employed workers by skill groups based on primary occupation			Unavailable	No
3. Availability of minimum policies and standards in occupational health and safety, social security and employee welfare			Unavailable	8.8.2 Increase in national compliance of labor rights based on ILO textual sources and national legislation

Source: Ministry and documents

The MTR reviewed progress against the NDP indicators, interventions, activities and processes aimed at achieving the targets. The labour and employment pillar set 3 target indicators in the NDP. Updated data was not available to the midterm reviewers during the assessment though a labour force survey and diagnostic scan is being planned, which would provide market related information data. However, there continue to be daunting challenges in meeting the targets due to a lack of institutional capacity, unreliable data and access limitation

Therefore, there is no reliable data to review the progress on the indicators. However, the MTR come across a number of initiatives that pillar is undertaking with the aim of achieving the targets.

¹⁸ Based on 2017 CEIC projection. <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/somalia/labour-force/so-labour-force>

The Somalia social protection policy is at its early stages of development. The policy outlines a number of ambitious requirements including state-owned and state led systems, long-term and predictable funding, pushing for a shift from the short-term cycles of humanitarian assistance, and strong international engagement for the foreseeable future. The MTR has determined that during the review period, the ‘Employment to population ratio’ indicator registered improvement, but was unable to determine whether or not the other the targets of the other two indicators were achieved due to lack of data.

4.1.6 Youth & Sports

Accessing data to review the progress on the targets in the NDP was a major challenge. The pillar has 5 targets, of which 3 have no baseline information. Nevertheless, data accessed by the MTR shows improvement in youth unemployment rate which has dropped to 10.9%, which is probably linked to Improvements in economic conditions and security in the country (Table 6). The review couldn’t determine if there have been improvements on key indicators around unemployment, youth access to micro-finance and participation in the labour force, because the labour force survey was yet to be conducted at time of the review. On output side some noteworthy progress has been seen on some of the interventions aimed at achieving the targets under the youth and sports sector, despite limited financial support from the government.

Table 6: Youth and sports - progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated data	SDGs alignments
3. 1. Youth unemployment rate	22%	17%	10.9%	8.5.2 Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities
4. 2. Number of young people having access to micro-finance and micro-credit schemes ¹⁹	Unknown		Unavailable	No
5. 3. Youth labour force participation rate	45.5%	49%	47.11%	8.6.1 Proportion of youth (aged 15-24 years) not in education, employment
6. 4. Incidence rate for youth migration and trafficking	Unknown		Unavailable	16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population
7. 5. Number of recreational and play grounds constructed	Unknown		Unavailable	No

Source: Ministry and documents

The FGS cabinet has adopted the National Youth Policy, which allows for legal and institutional development in this sector and lays the foundation for addressing the issues facing the youth. The policy is intended to be the basis for all programs targeting the youth, but a critical task forward will be the actual implementation of the National Youth Policy. Despite the limited resources, the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports has convened four planning retreats with the Ministries of Youth from Federal Member States, in order to increase coordination within the sector. As a result, a joint two-year work plan for the implementation of the youth policy was developed. Additionally, an interim National Youth Council has been established with nine members, including 7 youth representatives from each Federal Member State, 1 representing youth with disabilities and 1 representing minority clans. The Youth Council is hosting youth outreach activities in all Federal Member States. The Federal and Regional Ministries of Youth and Sports have also co-hosted the Inter-State Football Tournament in December 2017 and are currently developing the National Sports Policy.

Overall, eight out of ten Somalis (81.5%) are younger than 35 years old (Somalia Population Estimation Survey 2014, UNFPA) and 38% of the Somali population is between the ages of 15 and 35 (approximately 4.6 million people). Nevertheless, avenues for youth to obtain an education and gain meaningful employment are limited and opportunities

¹⁹ The planned LFS should collect this data

to engage them politically, economically, or socially remain weak or non-existent. Opportunities are even further restricted for girls and young women because of cultural biases and gendered traditional practices. Youth, the majority of whom are living on less than \$2 a day, are in constant risk and distinctly vulnerable to radicalization and ‘tahrrib’ (illegal migration that is life altering and often times fatal); as a result of marginalization, staggeringly low levels of unemployment and limited opportunities to gain an education and/or transferable life skills.

4.2 Productive Sector Development

Economic growth remains too low to improve the lives of most Somalis. According to the third economic update report of the World Bank, ‘real GDP growth averaged 2.5 per cent in the period from 2013 to 2017, while the population expanded by 2.9 per cent, resulting in a negative GDP per capita growth of minus 0.3 per cent annually’ (WB, 2018²⁰). The economy failed to create sufficient opportunities, particularly for women and young people. At the end of the reporting period, labour force participation among men was 58 per cent, compared to 37 per cent among women (WB, 2018). Nearly one in three Somalis faces conditions of extreme poverty.

4.2.1 Agriculture

The agriculture sector has set out 6 targets, which are to be achieved through a number of strategies and milestones stipulated in the NDP. The milestones are; strengthening institutional capacities, improving the agricultural infrastructure, increasing agricultural production, and creating effective agricultural markets. According to a joint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Bank, 2018, about 46 percent of employed people work in agriculture (25 percent in crop cultivation, 9 percent in herding, 4 percent in fishing, and 7 percent in related activities (see Table 7).

During the period under review, the ministry initiated a number of sectoral strategies and policies and formulated laws. The national agriculture strategic plan 2016-2020 has been completed and adopted. Others such as the plant protection and irrigation law, and the fertilizer and pesticide policies are on draft stages.

Table 7: Agriculture sector - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated data	SDGs alignment
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies and Strategies formulated and adopted			121	
2. No of irrigation systems rehabilitated/constructed			21622	
3. Farm land under irrigated agriculture (Hectares)	628,050 ha	753,660 ha	120,000ha ²³	2.4.1 Proportion of agricultural area under productive and sustainable agriculture
4. % of population dependent on agriculture for livelihoods			46%	5.a.1 (a) Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by sex
5. Underutilized or orphaned crops yield in Metric Tonnes	1,170 MT	5,000 MT	Unavailable	
6. Cereal yield in Metric Tonnes	126,800 MT	152,160 MT	78,801 MT ²⁴	

Source: Ministry and documents

Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL), reported creating 244 new jobs through sesame and fresh fruit production. The export of agricultural commodities reached US \$7.2 million through business networks established at Gulfood Fair and EPOSPEA in Ethiopia. Investments in the infrastructure and capacity development of fresh fruits and pulse industries have reached US \$11.7 million²⁵.

²⁰ World Bank, 3rd economic update report, Somalia

²¹ The national agriculture strategy 2016-2020

²² As reported by the ministry of Agriculture during the data collection (canal rehabilitation with the help of implementing partners like PIMS, FAO, and others)

²³ Data from MOA

²⁴ FAO & WB report 2018

²⁵ <https://goobjoog.com/english/achievements-of-geel-projects-in-somalia-in-2017/>

Furthermore, GEEL reported IN 2017, 2,156 persons were trained in new management practices adopted through multi-day trainings, demonstrations, mentoring and networking. Additionally, 8 new technologies were adopted, including drip irrigation and new varieties of water management. Additionally, the Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) provided support reaching over 520,000 with cash and seeds²⁶.

The drought of 2016/2017, as well as the reduced river flows, caused major damages and losses to both rain-fed and irrigated crops, including the perennial fruit tree crops. The drought has had a huge impact on the agriculture sector, including production losses arising from both the reduced land area under cultivation and reduced yields at harvest. The drought has had the largest impact on rain-fed staple food crops and on the irrigated crops in the Shabelle valley regions. Physical and monetary losses have been large for other crops; mainly fruits, vegetables and frankincense. As a consequence of both the high livestock-related mortality and the loss in crop production, by early 2017 over 1.6 million people had already exhausted their cereal stocks and became heavily dependent on markets (with cash purchases funded with remittances) and international food aid.

4.2.2 Fisheries

The FGS and FMS signed an interim revenue sharing arrangement during the NSC in May, 2017 in Mogadishu. The FGS moved forward with international partners in developing a regime for licensing foreign fishing vessels to operate in the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As of yet, no licenses have been issued. Consultations on the National Fisheries Development Policy drafted completed awaiting Ministerial and cabinet approval. Additionally, a draft strategy has been developed to combat illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. Equally, a number of guidelines have been developed such as, Fish quality and inspection, Registration of fish processing plants and Registration of boats.

A range of projects and initiatives worked with fishing companies, fishing co-operatives, fish traders and processors in an effort to improve the efficiency of the fishing sector and provide employment opportunities in the sector. These projects include USAID funded Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihood (GEEL) project, DFID funded Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS) project, FAO projects, and others. However, there is little consolidation of information and this makes it difficult to determine the cumulative results from different projects.

The Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihood (GEEL) project reported an increase fish exports reaching around US \$231 thousand to Ethiopia and Oman. Furthermore, the number of operational processing facilities in the country have increased at all major locations – Bossaso, Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayo and along some other coastal towns.; The increase in processing facilities can be attributed to an increase in financial support from projects and investments by diaspora populations.

Table 8: Fisheries sector - Progress on Indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignments
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted			127	No
2. No of fishing vessels registered			161228 vessels	No
3. No of landing sites rehabilitated/established		10	Unavailable	No
4. Value of fish caught in Somali waters (in \$ Million)	\$45 million	\$65 million	Unavailable	14.4.1 Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels
5. Annual value of fish and fisheries product exported (in \$ Million)			Unavailable	No

Source: Ministry and documents

²⁶ <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7400e.pdf>

²⁷ Ministry strategy 2018-2021

²⁸ 1612 and 6688 fishers registered (by 2017)

4.2.3 Livestock

Livestock is the backbone of the Somali economy and about 70% of the population in Somalia are dependent on livestock for their livelihood. (FGS, 2018)²⁹ The livestock population in Somalia is estimated to be 40 million animal heads. The sector provides food, direct employment for over 55% of the total labour force and contributes 40% of the GDP and 80% of the foreign currency earnings, excluding cash remittances.

The sector is however, constrained by chronic and persistent shocks such as; political instability, conflict, civilian displacement, cyclic droughts, inadequate early warning floods and outbreaks of transboundary animal diseases within Somalia and in the neighbouring countries. Due to the many constraints, the MTR could not find any meaningful data to make a determination on the progress made on the indicators of the NDP, as can be seen in Table 9 below.

Consecutive seasons of poor rainfall caused a widespread shortage of water and pasture and resulted in increases in livestock deaths in early 2017, which led an estimated damage and losses at 350,687,691 and 1,262,317,038 respectively (FGS, 2018)³⁰. Pastoralists endured poor rains and livestock losses and families became increasingly destitute and indebted.

FAO is delivering large-scale, strategic combinations of assistance to rural people at high risk of hunger, by providing them with cash transfers for food and water purchases, plus the means to veterinary care. FAO is currently providing livelihood support combined with cash (“Cash+”) to restore food production, while ensuring families meet immediate food needs; and veterinary livestock support to save livestock assets. Further USAID funded GEEL project created over 1,600 jobs on value chain activities. Furthermore, 928 hectares were developed for improved fodder production and 69,660 animals (12,460 cattle and 57,200 goats), valued at “US \$5.4 million” were exported³¹

The most recent and reliable figures by the Food Security & Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) in October 2017, which was agreed to as the pre-drought baseline figures by the FGS and international partners for the Drought Impact Needs Assessment (FGS 2017a), estimates the country’s livestock to be at 52.9 million heads.

Table 9: Livestock sector - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted			Unavailable	No
2. No of animal health facilities like veterinary hospitals, AIC, quarantine stations etc.			Unavailable	No
3. Annual national milk production increased by		20%	Unavailable	No
4. Annual value of livestock and livestock product exported (in \$ Million)		20%,	\$455m ³²	No

4.2.4 Hydrocarbon & Minerals

This section has for 4 indicators. The review could not find updated data for any of the indicators as data was not available from ministries and other sources. However, some of the ongoing activities include- the petroleum law, which is in parliament for discussion. Additionally, regulations such as Environment, Health and safety and Somali petroleum authority and SONOC are in the Parliament. While petroleum model agreement (PSA) was completed. On Mining the following policies, regulation and agreements are either in place, under review or in the preparation stage

- Mining policy in place

²⁹ <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/pdf/REPLACEMENT-PUBLIC-Somalia-Economic-Update-3-FINAL.pdf>

³⁰ Dina assessment vol 1

³¹ <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Somalia-GEEL-November-2018.pdf>

³² COMTRADE Data 2014

- The amendment of the Somali Mining Code 1984 is under preparation
- Mining Regulations: under review
- Mining Model Agreement needs review

Table 10: Hydrocarbons and minerals - Progress on indicators

	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted				No
2. No of PSAs negotiated and signed				No
3. Annual HC (Oil and Gas) production in the country				No
4. No of Artisanal Mines operating in the country				No

Source: Ministry and documents

4.3 Infrastructure Development

The MTR reviewed the 7 targets in the NDP. Of the 7 targets indicators data for only one indicators was available for the indicator on proportion of people with mobile phones. Therefore, the MTR could not determine the actual progress. However, some modest progress has been achieved in a few areas, mainly around inaugural activities such as; the drafting of policies, strategies and acts. Some of the policies and strategies developed in this sector are, the draft Somalia infrastructure strategy, national housing policy, national transport policy, Sustainable Energy Investment Policy and Energy Strategy and the land management and urban regulatory framework. None of the 10 policies, strategies and laws envisioned in the NDP have been adopted at the time of the review.

The Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF) is one of the financing windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). The SIF received a boost in May 2018, after Italy’s contribution of €1 million. Additionally, the AfDB, WB and EU are moving to utilize the WB, MPF, AfDB and SIF in order to strengthen the county systems. One challenges cited by the donors is that the NDP had no Economic Growth Strategy which makes it difficult to prioritise infrastructure projects, while they do not find the infrastructure section of the NDP useful for planning/prioritising projects. The donors and Pillar Working Groups (PWG) therefore rely more on the annual work plans, which they find more helpful, and prefer to set their own indicators.

Several laws are under preparation including; the Roads Act, the Highway Authority Act, and the Road Funding Act. To strengthen the human capacity at the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction & Housing (MPWRH), 21 vacancies have been advertised, including for an position to oversee the establishment of Geographical Information System (GIS). An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) advisor and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) advisor are being recruited to establish an ESIA and RAP unit within the MPWRH. Infrastructure development as per the above set indicators has progressed slowly since 2017. With regard to road construction and rehabilitation, the main project was the construction of the Jalam – Harfo section of the Garowe - Gaalkacyo corridor in Puntland. The project was funded by the European Union (EU) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The aim of the project was to repair 400 km of roads, of which only 14% of the works has been completed. Unfortunately, due to the high levels of corruption, the project has been terminated.

Under WB funding, The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has done the preliminary engineering designs for community roads in Mogadishu and urban roads in Garowe. The construction work is foreseen to commence at the end of 2018. Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) will be the main implementing partner, as the funds will be channelled through the WB MPF. The work will entail rehabilitating 7.5 km of community roads within 7 districts of Mogadishu and approximately 4.86 km of urban roads in Garowe. Further funding is expected in 2019 to help facilitate the interconnectivity of the above-mentioned roads. Since 2017, the Transport Sector Needs

Assessment has been conducted under the funding of the AfDB and the EU and has played a critical role in informing the SIF pipeline. The pipeline clearly outlines road prioritization, which the donor community is also keeping up with. In addition, plans are on-going to conduct a feasible and detailed design of urban roads in Kismayo and Baidoa and the designs are expected to be created in the first quarter of 2019. On the basis of these studies, the identified roads will be selected for construction in early 2020. According to World Bank Somalia economic update 3, mobile money has become an essential and widespread part of Somalia's economic eco-system. Almost three-quarters of the population 16 and older (73 percent) use mobile money.

Table 11: Infrastructure development - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
7. 1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted			0	n/a
8. 2. Kilometres of main inter-city, inter-state and inter-region rehabilitated/constructed	2,860 km		Unavailable	No
9. 3. No of Airports, airfields and airstrips rehabilitated/constructed	Total-60 Major- 7 Airstrips- 23		Unavailable	No no
10. 4. No of main and secondary ports rehabilitated/constructed	Main- 4 Secondary- 10		Unavailable	No
11. 5. Proportion of population with access to durable electricity			Unavailable	7.1.1 Proportion of population with access to electricity
12. 6. Proportion of population using internet	1%		Unavailable	17.8.1 Proportion of individuals using the Internet
13. 7. Proportion of population with mobile phones			73%	5.b.1 Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex

Source: Ministry and document

4.4 Resilience

The NDP has 13 performance indicators for the resilience pillar. The MTR faced a challenge in accessing data to review the progress. However, In the review period, the MTR noted achievements in some aspects such as in the development and adoption of the disaster management policies and the resilience and recovery framework. Other policies in drafting stage include the national social protection policy and the employment strategies. As a consequence of the adoption of the national disaster management policy, the ministries of Humanitarian and disaster management established the first national emergency operation centre, which coordinated the emergency operations in the aftermath of the 14 October 2017 attack in Mogadishu.

The resilience PWGs are organized into 3 main sub working groups: migration, displacement and durable solutions; food security, nutrition and social protection; and environmental protection and climate change. The key achievement in the resilience pillar is the approval of the National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) by the cabinet, the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF). While the NDMP is critical in managing and coordinating disaster response across the country, the roll out and implementation of the policy has yet to be realized due to lack of funding. In mid-2017, the FGS, specifically MoPIED, initiated a Drought Impact Needs Assessment IN 2018, to quantify the effects of the drought and informed the development of a consulted and costed RRF. According to the humanitarian snapshot reported, August 2018, the 2017 drought led to additional 1.5 million displacements (OCHA, 2018), which is expected to further strain social services in the existing IDPs camps. There are no official figures on the no of migrants/refugees repatriated through formal mechanisms, however, UNCHR data 2018, indicates 120,000 persons repatriated into the country.

In regards to community based resilience projects, a number of resilience consortiums such as; SomReP, Somalia Resilience Action Consortium (STREAM,) BRCiS, along with UN joint programs such as; UNICEF, WFP and FAO, have set out to address community-based resilience needs by implementing various activities across the country.

There is no national social protection program yet but there exist project based safety net programs such as the STREAM resilience consortium, which has being providing regular predictable transfer of \$ 40 for 5,000 households in Lower Juba. There is also growing interest from development partners, NGOs and government in transition the cash programs to safety nets and the need for a single registry system. Meanwhile, a technical working group was

formed to develop the Social Protection Policy and the World Bank has prepared a project brief on a shock-responsive social safety nets delivery system for the SDRF. Additionally, a review of the draft policy on refugee-returnees and IDPs and the development of a refugee law for returning migrants is still under discussion. SWS is also in the process of developing an IDP strategy/policy which is context specific.

Low government revenues and weak public capital investment – including in water infrastructure and management – remain a constraint on protecting livelihoods from climate-related shocks in a weather-dependent economy. National systems to support and guide resilience building are being rolled out. The FGS’ National Development Council brings together planning ministries from the FMS. The National Economic Council will advise on economic development opportunities and MoPIED is leading the development of an investment promotion facility.

Table 12: Resilience - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGS alignment
1. No. of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated + adopted for each sector mentioned in the goal			2	1.5.3 Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies
2. No of households registered under National Social Protection Program			Unavailable	1.3.1 Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems,
3. No of National and Regional disaster management organizations and centers established and functional			Unavailable	
4. Proportion of population and livestock affected by disasters			Unavailable	1.5.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people
5. Total No of displaced people	1.1m		2.6m ³³	11.1.1 Proportion of urban population living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing
6. No of IDPs reached out and successfully reintegrated and provided better living conditions			Unavailable	No
7. No of migrants/refugees repatriated through formal mechanisms			Unavailable	No
8. Number of houses constructed for displaced/ returnees			Unavailable	No
9. No of people registered as overseas Somalis				No
10. Proportion of people dependent on charcoal for fuel	90%?		No	7.1.2 Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology
11. Forest cover as % of total land	10.63 (2010)		No	15.1.1 Forest area as a proportion of total land area
12. 12. Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area				15.3.1 Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area
13. 13. Indicator of food price anomalies				2.c.1 Indicator of food price anomalies

4.5 Building Effective & Efficient Institutions

Promising progress has been made on clarifying ministerial mandates and functions. The cabinet approved the Federal civil service law to proceed to the lower house for debate. Similarly, the Puntland draft Civil Service Labour Law has been drafted. A number of FGS miniseries developed strategic plans, among them are the education sector strategic plan, the health sector strategic plan, the agriculture strategic plan etc. The federal member states have also developed state strategic plan i.e. Jubaland, SWS, and Puntland.

All the 26 FGS ministries visited by the review team had established offices. Likewise, all new Federal Member States initial organizational structures, mandates and personnel establishments have been made or are close to completion, setting the stage for a coherent and transparent public sector. In regards to the monitoring and evaluation function, nearly all the FGS ministries reported the lack of m&e department or where there it exist it is merely functional due lack of resources to run the department. However, MoPIED MIS and the OP AIMS have been established.

³³ UNHCR report 2018

On the political front, the advancement the Political Roadmap, which outlines priorities and functions of different bodies to release the major political priorities in the country (federalism, constitutional review and elections) in a common framework is a major progress. The establishment of the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee was productive in reaching agreements at the National Security Council

The new Statistics Law is under parliamentary approval process and a draft statistics Strategy has been developed and is under review. The 2nd High Frequency Survey for poverty analysis has been conducted and a dedicated effort is ongoing for the population estimates. The National Economic Council was launched in August and is expected to provide guidance in the economic development arena.

Table 13: Building effective institutions - Progress on indicators

	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted for public sector institutions				n/a
2. No of Ministries/institutions with clear organizational structures, rules of business and terms of reference in place		28 Ministries	26 ministries	No
3. No of Ministries with appropriate and equipped office buildings		28 Ministries	26	
4. No of Ministries with appropriate M&E and statistical systems in place				17.18.3 Number of countries with a national statistical plan that is fully funded and under implementation by
5. Proportion of government concurrent expenditure as proportion of annual budget				No

Source: Ministry and documents

4.6 Peace, Inclusive Politics, Security & Rule of Law

A key campaign of the current Federal Government of Somalia has been to prepare the country for the transfer of power through inclusive, democratic, transparent and credible elections of one-person-one-vote by 2020, deepen the federalism and reconciliation agenda, complete the constitutional review process and strengthen international relations for a peaceful and prosperous Somalia. While modest progress is being made, continuous standoff and tension between FGS, FMS and crises resulting from competition for power and resources, complicated by the weakness of national institutions, ambiguities in the Constitution and teething problems relating to the emergence of federal arrangements is slowing down progress.

In an effort to achieve its promise FGS adopted a Roadmap on Inclusive Politics, in January 2018. The Roadmap defines the main goals to be delivered and milestones/benchmarks to be accomplished by the responsible institutions in order to implement political priorities set by the current government. The FGS held Somali National Constitutional Convention on 13-15 May 2018, to ensure mandated institutions to refocus and prioritize energy on the completion of the Constitutional Review Process (CRP). The draft electoral law for the 2020 elections has been submitted to the Cabinet for review. So far a total 27 parties have been registered under the temporary registration. Other key achievements include political agreements related to federalism, the FGS and FMS agreement on fisheries (February 2018) and oil & mineral resources-sharing (June 2018) (Table 13)

On the security, the MTR gathered 14,920 security forces on the various biometric systems that are either linked to payroll (5400 FGS & 2160 Puntland) or those on biometric registration but not linked with payroll, which is 7,360. The Architecture the long term goal is to biometrically register 18,000 SNA officers and link them to payroll. In regards to correction facilities, about 9 facilities of the target 13 in the NDP have either been constructed or rehabilitated, hence progress in well on track. There was no updated data available for the number of small arms possessed by citizens, while, the small Arms and light Weapons and the private security company Acts are pending before parliament.

Table 14: Peace, Inclusive Politics, Security & Rule of Law - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	Alignment with SDGs
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted		N/A	N/A	No
2. Availability of new Federal constitution		Yes	No	No
3. No of political parties registered for 2020 elections		23	27 ³⁴	No
4. No of districts with functioning councils		100		No
5. No of security forces i.e. 1) Army, 2) Navy, 3) Coast Guard, 3) Police Biometrically registered and tied to pay role	N/A	N/A	N/A	No
6. No of Small Arms possessed by citizens (Survey results)	NA	N/A	N/A	16.4.2 Proportion of seized small arms and light weapons that are recorded and traced
7. No of conflict/terrorism related deaths				16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 populations, by sex, age
8. No of cases 1) Filed, 2) Decided, 3) Pending				16.3.2 Un-sentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population
9. No of people receiving legal aid	N/A	N/A	N/A	No
10. No of Correctional facilities/prisons rehabilitated/established	9	13	9	No

Source: Ministry and documents

Additionally, a number of projects supported the prioritizing engagement between government and communities within the Puntland, Jubaland, and the South West States of Somalia, Banadir Regional Authority, and the Sool and Sanaag regions such as Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+). The National Reconciliation Framework supported by UNDP, promoted inclusive political dialogue and harmony across Somali clans and marginalized communities including reconciliation ceasefire agreements in conflict prone areas: Merka in Southwest, Dollow in Jubaland, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma, in Galmudug, Galkayo North (Puntland) and South (Galmudug). Other achievements include, an agreement on the electoral model by the National Security Council in Baidoa (June 2018), the completion and publication of a voter registration feasibility study; commencement of political party registration; the adoption and launch of the NIEC Strategic Plan.

4.7 Macroeconomics and poverty

According to the world bank 2017, Somalia's population lags behind most of all the low-income African countries in availability and access to basic infrastructure, equally poverty is widespread with every second Somali living in poverty in 2016, before the onset of the 2017 drought. Somalia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has modestly grown and is projected to grow at 3.1% from the 2.3% in the 2017. However, the world bank reports the modest growth in the recent years has not been sufficient to reduce poverty.

Similarly, Somalia recorded progress in domestic revenue collection through mid-2018. Domestic revenue collection stood at 42.3 million, the first quarter 2018, surpassing its target. However, according to the WB 2018, FGS revenue collection overall remains low (2% of GDP) for the government to provide services. However, the growth remains vulnerable to recurrent shocks.

While the national revenue of Somalia has been growing significantly in recent years, that is, from US \$113 million in 2016 (domestic revenue only) to US 143million in 2017, while in the first quarter of 2018, the government raised US\$42Million (WB Economic Update 2018). While the MTR was ongoing the MOF reported that in 2018 domestic revenue was \$184 million, outstripping the annual projection of US\$156Million., it should be noted that this revenue

³⁴ Temporary registration until political parties are registered.

was mainly from the Mogadishu seaport and International Airport and little contribution from other internal sources. Refer to Table 14.

Overall, there are nascent progress in the macroeconomic and poverty pillar especially in especially growth in GDP, increase in domestic revenue collection while these progresses are promising, there is need to do more and sustain the gains in order to realize impacts in poverty reduction and provision of basic services.

Table 15: Macroeconomics and poverty - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	Alignment with SDGs
1. Annual GDP growth rate (%)	3	6	3.1	8.1.1 Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita
2. Abroad (Diaspora) remittance transfers (\$) and as proportion to GDP	\$1.4 billion		\$1.4 billion ³⁵	17.3.2 Volume of remittances (in USD) as a proportion of total GDP
3. Annual investment growth rate (%)		38.2%	Unavailable	No
4. Annual Productive Sector Growth Rate (%)		4.6%		No
5. While it falls short of the 15% target set in the Use of Country Systems Roadmap, ¹⁴ it represents a significant improvement from 2016 when US\$ 55.3 million (8% of development aid) was delivered on treasury	N/A	26.2		9.a.1 Total official international support (official development assistance plus other official flows) to infrastructure
6. Annual Social and Other Services Sector Growth Rate (%)	NA	4.1%		No
7. Annual Domestic Revenues (\$ Million)			42.3 million	No
8. Revenue as proportion of GDP	3.7		2%	17.1.1 Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP, by source
9. Proportion of people below poverty line with a poverty line of \$1.58 per capita (PPP)	69%		69% ³⁶	1.2.1 Proportion of population living below the national poverty line, by sex and age
10. %age of total budgetary allocations for poverty reduction programmes				1.a.1 Proportion of resources allocated by the government to poverty reduction programmes

Source: Ministry and documents

4.8 Private sector development

Somalia is ranked last in the 2018 Doing Business ratings. Weak institutions, insecurity, a persistent insurgency, dilapidated infrastructure, environmental degradation, and climate change are major obstacles to Somalia’s economic development, especially in the southern regions (WB, FAO 2018). The long-term vision of the NDP is to develop a “Strong, peaceful, democratic and stable state capable enough of delivering basic services to its citizens and committed to protect their fundamental rights” while creating a vibrant, robust and competitive private sector that contributes to the sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation. Emerging from the consultation of NDP, Somalia National Public Private Dialogue (PPD) was established. The first public was held in London on May 2017, the forum which brought together a wide range of private sector is a step forward to build trust and build consensus priorities. The private sector demanded improvement in the legal and regulatory framework that are bottleneck to private sector development, especially for the banking sector. Two energy and 1 financial sector working group meetings were held. A meeting with the Parliamentary Sub Committee on Economic, Trade, Industry was also held to review the Companies Act. Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) developed a tracking system for reform progress.

³⁵ WB economic update 2018, 3

³⁶ No new data

A Financial Sector Road Map was prepared and circulated by the Central Bank of Somalia for consultation with stakeholders. Implementation of the roadmap will lead to improvements in financial intermediation, in turn supporting economic activity in Somalia. MoPIED and MoCI have operationalized the Foreign Investment Law.

In November 2017 the Somali Business Catalytic Fund was launched which aims to spur economic growth in country by supporting SMEs and entrepreneurs. Additionally, FGS and FMS reached petroleum and mining revenue sharing agreements and an interim fisheries revenue sharing agreement. The financial sector roadmap has been prepared and circulated for consultation with key stakeholders in July 2018. After consultations are completed it will be tabled before the Board of the Central Bank of Somalia for approval

4.9 Aid management and coordination

As reported by the aid flow analysis aid flow in Somalia totaled to \$1.75 billion. The increase was primarily driven by the surge in the 2017 response (WB, 2018). During this period the share of aid delivered on the treasury also increased to more than \$100 million (14% of development aid), While it falls short of the 15% target set in the Use of Country Systems Roadmap, it represents a significant improvement from 2016 when US\$ 55.3 million (8% of development aid) was delivered on treasury. The support was delivered mainly through three channels: projects financed by donors through the World Bank Multi Partner Fund (MPF), general budget support provided by Saudi Arabia and sector budget support provided by Turkey (Aid flow, FGS 2018) (Table 15)

Table 16: Aid management and coordination - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. Total development aid made available on yearly basis (\$ Mill)			US\$ 1.75 billion	17.9.1 Dollar value of financial and technical assistance committed to developing countries
2. Aid-to-GDP ratio (%)	23.5 (2015)		26%	
3. % of development aid channeled through country planning and financial management systems			14%	17.15.1 Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development cooperation
4. Availability of appropriate aid coordination and joint M&E Mechanisms			Yes	17.16.1 Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness
5. % share of development aid in NDP implementation			Unavailable	
6. Proportion of aid delivered vs. commitments				
7. Proportion of projects designed and implemented with the participation by the relevant ministry/agency				17.15.1 Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development cooperation

Source: Ministries and secondary data

4.10 Gender mainstreaming

The current parliament has the highest number of women representing 24% of parliamentarians. Though this didn't meet the legal requirement of 30% quota, it represent a significant improvement from 2012, which had only 14% women representation. As stated in the NDP, further progress need to be made on equal gender representation of 50% of either gender. In regards to the gender indicators, the identified progress in the passing of the sexual offence bill. Similarly, as stated above the representation of women in parliament increased to a record high of 24%. Also data available to the review indicate about the proportion of women representation in key parliamentary committees at 30%.

Table 17: Gender mainstreaming - Progress on indicators

Indicators	2016	2019	Updated Data	SDGs alignment
1. No of relevant Laws, Policies, Strategies formulated and adopted for gender mainstreaming			1 Sexual offence bill	5.1.1 Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote and enforce equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex
2. Proportion of women in all levels of political participation at national and sub-national levels		30%	24%	5.5.1 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments
3. Proportion of women in civil services/Public sector institutions			Unavailable	5.5.2 Proportion of women in managerial positions
4. Proportion of women representation in key parliamentary committees;			30%	No
5. Share of women in labour force	35%	40%	Unavailable	
6. Prevalence of FGM	98	70		11.7.2 Proportion of persons victim of physical or sexual harassment, by sex,
7. No of cases registered/pursued related to GBV				5.3.2 Proportion of girls and women who have undergone FGM

5 CONCLUSION

Somalia National Development Plan (NDP) was a courageous initiative by the government of Somali to set a vision for the country's development under extremely challenging political, security and socioeconomic environment. This 8th version, and the first one by a central government in Somalia in 30 years was hailed as a Somali-owned and Somali-led approach to national development. It was also praised for embedding the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a show of strong commitment to the global development agenda. NDP8 is however, criticised for being overly ambitious in its goals and timeframe and without clear financing strategy and commensurate intuitional capacity to deliver on these targets within the short span of three years.

DNP penetration process: Despite scepticism of its deliverability, NDP8 was received very well by government and development partners as framework for mainstreaming national development efforts, and providing basis for accountability. The management of NDP implementation process received good attention from the government and development partners in form of platforms for coordination and financing architecture; execution plans, framework for monitoring, evaluation and reporting. Public, private and Development Partners have shown enthusiasm to achieve key sectoral goals and organised player around key development pillars, but progress was hampered by highly fragmented aid, severe capacity and access limitations, compounded by volatile political, security, economic and social challenges.

Coordination: Although much stronger at the strategic and policy level, and weak at regions, the existing coordination structure (including NSP, SDRF, PWG, Sub-working groups, etc.) which also doubles up as a financing architecture, provide a useful platform for providing direction, fund raising, progress tracking and documentation of challenges/lessons. With vibrant secretariat, the coordination forums were found fairly strong at strategic (FGS) level. Attendance are found to be inclusive, under the chairmanship of the highest level of the government including the President/Prime Ministers (NSP), Deputy Prime Minister(SDRF) and Ministers/DGs (PWG/SWG). However, effectiveness these coordination forums has been questioned particularly at the operational (State) level. For the coordination meetings, FMS often send junior staff on rotational basis for own motivation purposes, leading to poor representation and loose follow up on action points. Agenda are sometimes not informed by NDP priorities. Based on the current size and frequency (about 72 meetings per year) these meetings are burdensome. As a financing architecture, only 20% of development aid are channelled the SDRF, leaving about 80% of total funding unaccounted for through the established coordination and financing mechanism. The SDRF for example, is said to be a parallel model of the Council of Ministers who should be discussing and development projects.

Comprehensive **Monitoring and Evaluation** framework and a national M&E policy to guide the process, including provision for the frequency of reviews and sources of funds for the M&E functions. But there was little evidence of any effective monitoring of any development projects for outcome evaluation or value for money scrutiny either by MOPIED or the line ministries at the FGS or FMS; the technical capacity or the resources to do that. Effective Monitoring and evaluation specially of outcome indicators, is made almost impossible by lack of credible data. Directorate of **Statistics** began to produce and disseminate harmonization statistical information that will provide firm evidence base decisions, effective government policies and management of public service delivery. It however has long way to go to achieve that.

Mutual accountability and principles of partnership: There were marginal successes in the implementation of the shared objectives of: political settlements, security, rule of law, youth empowerment,

financial and economic management, gender and human rights, inclusion as well and inclusion and resilience. Similar, significant grounds have been covered to ward key indicators on the principles of partnership and enablers such as Somali ownership and alignment, use of preferred instruments, coordination, transparent and accountability and host of cross-cutting themes.

Performance of mandated instructions: Public and private institutions have all important parts to play in the successful implementation of the National Development Plan. OPM has through the aid coordination and delivery units occasionally interacted with key stakeholders and the public through NDP coordination forums and the media. However, the MTR did not find evidence of tangible efforts, including routine platforms, aimed at: increasing public awareness, participation in and providing periodic updates on the NDP progress. The MTR also could not trace signs of consistent publications informing the cabinet on the status of the NDP as required from MOPIED. While MOF largely failed to raised specific funds for the delivery of NDP 8, their noticeable efforts in increasing domestic revenue mobilisation, appeasing donors meeting the necessary PFM reforms and benchmark requirement increases the prospects more funds becoming available for future NDPs. Development Partners were instrumental to the government efforts to deliver the NDP through financial, technical and expert advisory for successful NDP implementation. However, the government expressed frustration for poorly aligned and uncoordinated financing of larger proportion of the development programmes through the international organizations. Direct budget to the government has also steadily increased during the period under review.

Progress towards key development indicators:

On the review of the NDP indicators, the MTR found that there were serious data gaps at the national level. Data gaps were both in the baseline and current status data. There were some fragmented data available with different implementing partners, but this could be used to determine progress. The review found that there was not a single sector which had a complete set of baseline and updated data on its indicators. Overall progress of the NDP could not be determined due to lack of data. In 63% of the indicators there was no baseline data, while for 58% of the indicators there was no updated data. Where both baseline and updated data was available, only for 8% of the indicators (scattered across sectors) was progress on track, while in 13% of the indicators, progress was off track. The MTR was able to identify new data for 22 indicators that did not originally have baseline figures. 2019 targets were not also available on many indicators. In terms data availability, the Nutrition, Health, Education, Agriculture, and Macroeconomics in that order had baseline data for at least 40% of their indicators, while Agriculture, Education, WATSAN, Health, Macroeconomics, and Aid Management sectors, roughly in that order had had updated data on at least over 50% of their indicators. All the other sectors had no data recorded or had less than 30% of their indicators having any data recorded.

6 GAPS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

- i. **NDP8 is unrealistic:** Under the prevailing security, political and social realities, the frequent humanitarian emergencies in the country and considering the wide scope, short timeline and budgetary limitations, NDP 8 parameters were largely unrealistic and unattainable. Furthermore, there was neither a recognition nor provision to account for these critical issues in the NDP 8 draft – such as recognition of risks and mitigation measures. The little progress that has been realized in NDP implementation, as found by the MTR, bears testimony to this fact.
- ii. **The NDP8 interventions not costed.** Although the NDP set out ambitious targets both in terms of timing and scope, there was no budget attached to achieving the three-year targets. Subsequent implementation plans such as the annual work plans largely lacked budgets and timelines. Line Ministries had work plans, but while most contributed to the management of the implementation process, they do not necessarily feed into the NDP outcomes. These plans were also severely
- iii. **Lack of NDP-specific financing:** The NDP was designed with no clear financing mechanisms or sources in mind. There was neither adequate external commitments, nor financing from internal government sources, specifically to finance the NDP. For example, the NDP envisaged an increase in sectoral budget allocation to key sectors by at least 12%, but there were no sources of financing identified for that purpose. Similarly, although NDP implementation management costs such as the monitoring and evaluation was foreseen in the NDP, no budget for the same was factored in. This is probably why the MTR exercise was delayed. While donor funding contributed to the NDP goals in one way or another there was no funding earmarked for the realization of specific NDP interventions and milestones; in fact some donors have indicated they are not necessarily guided by the NDP to plan or fund programs because they don't find the NDP does not provide priorities and proper guidance. In the absence of the costing (Budget), NDP-specific financing and records of actual expenditure against the NDP, It is almost impossible to assess NDP implementation efficiency.
- iv. **Limitation to a Somali-owned, Somali-led development process:** Although direct budgetary support to the government has marginally increased during the period under review, the vast proportion of the development and humanitarian aid is still channeled through implementing partners - largely international NGOs. As a result, the government's which bears the duty of the NDP implementation lacks the financial and human resources wherewithal to execute this mandate. The continuing overreliance on external actors renders the government's national development effort an unsustainable pursuit. There is also a sense that the federal government is not always working in harmony with the FMSs and this sometimes gives loopholes for development and implementing partners to not coordinate well with all parts within the federal system of government – further weakening the government's ability to own and lead development.
- v. **Volatile political and security environment for the NDP:** Political disharmony within and between the federal units of the country limits NDP coverage and hampers collective achievements towards its overall goals. For example, key priorities of the NDP around the constitutional review, democratization, state of security, federalism and state formation processes remain work in progress. Technical engagements with FMSs including approaches to ongoing projects and M&E support face significant barriers in some of the States.
- vi. **Weak national statistical data:** The Monitoring and evaluation of a national development plan requires data from a national census and/or routine surveys by a fully functional national statistical office or input from well-coordinated national development programs. Most of the data were often fragmented, localized and unrepresentative of the aggregate sectoral or national data, making it difficult to make an overall determination of the progress on the NDP implementation. While progress was made in building the capacity of the National Statistics Directorate the ability of the directorate or indeed any of the line ministries to provide enough data/information for the purpose of the MTR was limited.
- vii. **Weak Monitoring and Evaluation:** The M&E function of the government is still nascent. The M&E Directorate under the Ministry of Planning, Investment and economic Development (MoPIED) is inadequately staffed in terms of number and capacity to fulfil its national mandate. Despite the M&E Policy requiring a proportion of projects to be dedicated for M&E, there was no budget to finance the operations of the Directorate.

- viii. **NDP coordination vibrant at strategic level, weak at operational level:** The NDP coordination architecture (including NSP, SDRF, PWG, Sub-working groups, etc.) was found befitting of an NDP implementation and its functions at the top strategic level is also robust. Secretarial and logistical support structures are also fairly strong. Membership and attendance of the coordination mechanisms/forums are found to be fairly inclusive. However, effectiveness at the operational level is weak; the substance of the discussions in these forums and follow-up actions were found to be inadequate. Representation from federal member states were often of junior level. The time and logistical costs of organising these meetings at the current frequency (about 72 meetings per year) are burdensome.
- ix. **NDP priorities versus donor priorities:** While the NDP is broad enough to accommodate all major development themes, there are instances where the NDP was inadequate to provide sufficient or specific strategy/policy guidance to satisfy certain donor funding criteria. For instance, there were cases when the donor funding was not necessarily guided the NDP, but instead by global commitments or the national interest of the donor government. Many donors consider as a impressive document best for guiding inter-ministerial thinking, that lack of the necessary policy guidelines (e.g. infrastructure), therefore incapable of the NDP as an interim.
- x. **Private sector and the NDP:** While the private sector contributes significantly to the economic and social development of the country, they are not adequately engaged in the NDP implementation and evaluation process. For example, they participate in the high-level coordination forums such as the NPS, but their potential involvement in the NDP activities is untapped at operational level is, while there is little accountability to the NDP.
- xi. **Inadequate coordination and donor funding:** While it is easy to track funding that comes through the MPPTF and other traditional sources, the same cannot be said about funding from ‘non-traditional’ donors, who apply different accountability and programming modalities as compared to Western donors. Most of the non-traditional donors participate in the coordination forums but are not usually forthcoming with the detail on their funding and programs at the NDP coordination platforms.
- xii. **Growing Internationalization of aid threatens sustainability development work:** The 2011/12 famine response has shown the value of local agencies with the necessary capacity and access to affected hard-to-reach areas. With the competition for funds getting stiffer from INGOs, In Somalia N/LNGOs are increasing getting underutilized. A study done by the humanitarian policy group revealed a negligible proportion of aid funds going to the local development actors. for example, in 2017 drought response only 3.5% of estimated 1.4 billion went through the government and local NGOs.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

- i. **Develop long term visions from which realistic NDPs are extracted:** Somalia needs to identify a long-term vision and break this down into realistic and attainable development plans of between 3-5 years, considering prevailing circumstances and priorities. These shorter-term plans need to be based on high priority, impactful interventions on the basis of their potential to produce multiplier effects on the social, economic, political and other sectors of the country.
- ii. **Budget proactively for the NDP and map financing:** The NDP and its implementation plan (including the remaining phase of NDP 8) need to be accompanied by sectoral budget estimates for both program deliverables and operational costs. The operational budget should give priority to start-up costs covering the establishment of mechanism for coordination, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, including the MTR and Final Evaluation; this was overlooked in NDP8.
- iii. **Make funds available for NDP implementation:** While there are many factors responsible for the disappointing performance of the NDP indicators, milestones and targets (including an overwhelming scope and a short timeline, insecurity, etc), a key barrier to the progress on the NDP is the lack of finance especially from government sources. The NDP has a number of sectors where the government commitment to increasing internal financing of project has been identified, but this funding has not been forthcoming. For example the NDP committed government to increase budget allocation by 12% but the review shows no such increase happening. While there is some improvement in security, a large population that lives outside government-controlled areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity. Development partners can also directly support this effort by supporting government to develop a realistic NDP9, and thereafter be ready to re-adjust their development plans and resources in support of the NDP. They could also encourage government's efforts to finding additional self-financing of its budgets, through her active work in meeting the IMF/EU benchmarks. Also in response to the government improving its PFM, donors should further incentivize the government by increasing funding through the UCS, while being cognisant of the fact that this will be done incrementally in a manner that is guided by mutually agreed milestones.
- iv. **Increase commitment to Somali-owned, Somalia-led development:** The NDP drafting was a consultative process which was marketed as Somali-led and Somali-owned process, with an ambition that its implementation will follow suit. To make better progress towards Somali leadership and ownership in the rest of NDP8 and NDP9, the government needs to map and identify predictable funding sources – from own and multilateral/bi-lateral sources - that are better aligned with and more accountable to the NDP. There is also need by the government to improve coordination between the federal government and federal member states and harmonize their actions in order that development and implementing partners get the same message from the two government levels. On the other hand, development partners and implementers need to support the government's coordination and harmonization efforts, and must ensure that all their actions contribute to a stronger and more harmonized federal-federal member state relations.
- v. **Create conducive environment for sustainable NDP result:** The government needs to prioritize the creation of the necessary political, security, governance environment for timely NDP implementation and ensuring its sustainability. This calls for fast tracking enablers that were prioritized in the MAF, such as enhancing security, completing constitution review, delivering on democratization, judiciary and political settlement on federalism and strengthening resilience of communities against natural disasters and complex emergencies.
- vi. **Strengthen national statistics capability:** There is a need to continue strengthening the ongoing technical, technological, and operational capacity of the National Statistics Directorate to become a source of credible and up-to-date data and information for all national development indicators.
- vii. **Strengthen the capacity of the national M&E Directorate:** realising the critical M&E function of the NDP will need significant investment in the form of manpower, technical and technological upgrading. The capability of the MIS that in is in place needs to be re-assessed, improved and rolled out, so that better data management, increased transparency and easier access to data is realized. A proportion of funding for all projects should be allocated and made available for the M&E function as per the national M&E policy.

- viii. **Strengthen aid structure, coordination and cost effectiveness:** Federal level coordination meetings should focus more on strategic and policy level discussion while state level meetings should be concerned with NDP implementation. This will help reduce the frequency of coordination meetings in Mogadishu that require movement of large of people from FMS and vise-versa to a maximum of bi-annual (6 monthly) meetings. Devolve as many of the coordination meetings to the state and Increase their frequency at that level. This will reduce costs and leave more time for field-based implementation of the NDP. Invest in more time preparing for these meetings to improve the substance of the discussions that lead to actionable resolutions. Develop guideline for the level/grade of staff allowed to participate and exert strict control.
- ix. **Accommodate funding criteria to cover national needs:** International Development partners are critical for the success of the NDP. The government should endeavor to bring development partners on board regarding the new NDP development at the earliest (concept) stages of process. This will enable them give technical input, based on best practice, align their programs accordingly and agree on way forward for a predictable and flexible financing strategies. While Somali government should insist on basing development planning and approaches strictly on the priority needs of the Somali people, the new NDP should, to the extent possible, accommodate specific criteria and priorities for funding when driven by shared global commitments.
- x. **Improve private sectors engagements:** Private sector is the backbone of Somalia's economy injecting billions of dollars into the economy the and therefore the social through employment, financial aid to the government, growing sources domestic revenue for the government and a formidable player in disaster risk reduction and response through charities and cooperate social responsibilities.
- xi. **Streamline donor funding for ease of accountability:** The government should create a coordination environment where all development partners see value in their participation. Where necessary government may consider creating separate platforms for donor of similar interests and values.
- xii. **Localisation of development:** A concrete dialogue is necessary to establish workable plan for increasing the capacity of local humanitarian and development actors to ensure wider coverage of interventions and sustainability. There is need to direct more resources towards established national, and local development actors including government institutors, companies, not-for-profit organisations and civil societies. The government should put in place the necessary regulatory frameworks to ensure accountability.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Progress on Partnership Principles and enabling actions

2017 Partnership Principles & Enabling Actions		2018 Partnership Principles & Enabling Actions	
Somali Ownership & Alignment	Status 2017 Benchmarks	Somali Ownership & Alignment	Status of Benchmarks as of July 2018
1. Baseline established for assessing alignment of development aid with NDP Priorities*	In progress: Baseline data collected. 99.6% of aid captured in the aid mapping reported against an NDP Pillar. Programmatic alignment would require further assessment	1. Increased % of development aid aligned with NDP Priorities (%)*	In progress: Baseline data collected in 2017 and disseminated in 2018 by MoPIED. Whereas the mapping revealed high level strategic alignment with the NDP Pillars, the extent of programmatic alignment would require further analysis.
2. Increased % of development aid implemented by or with government	Achieved: 10% of development aid implemented by government (Jan-Oct); expected to rise to 12-13% by end of 2017 (compared with 8% in 2016). An additional 20% of development aid reported to have a mix of implementers including government.	2. Increased % of development aid implemented by or with government	Achieved: 16% of development aid was implemented by government in 2017. Of all projects reported in the aid mapping, including some humanitarian activities, 38% of financing was implemented with government.
3. Increased share of aid to newly formed states (South West, Jubaland, Galmudug, Hiirshabelle)	Achieved: While the share of aid increased marginally in 2017 (34% compared with 32% in 2016), the overall volume of aid to these states went up 20% from US\$ 259 m to US\$ 311 m.	3. Increased share of aid to newly formed states (South West, Jubaland, Galmudug, Hiirshabelle) and BRA	Achieved: Final figures for 2017 revealed a significant increase in the volume of reported aid (US\$ 521.2 million in 2017 compared with US\$ 359.2 in 2016). The share of reported aid increased only slightly from 48 to 51% (calculations exclude aid lacking a reported location). See Section 7 of Aid Flows report for more detail.
Use of Preferred Instruments	Status 2017 Benchmarks	Use of Preferred Instruments	Status of Benchmarks as of July 2018
4. Better budget execution controls* - Reintroduction of PFM law incorporating FGC recommendations - Security sector payroll automation completed	Partially achieved: PFM law reintroduced with FGC recommendations (complete) Security sector payroll automation in progress	4. Better budget execution controls* - Cash management plan implemented - Human resources management system established for security sector payroll	In progress: Together with the IMF FGS had agreed a fiscal framework that called for a 2018 budget reflecting changes in revenue measures and expenditures Security payroll under process to be automated to bank accounts. Security payroll reform underway. The Debt & Arrears Management Committee (DAMC) established and meets regularly.
5. Partners increase share of development aid channelled through the treasury to 15%*	Partially achieved: 10% of development aid delivered on treasury based on Jan-Oct expenditure data reported by the Ministry of Finance. Expected to reach 12-13% by end of 2017.	5. Partners increase share of development aid channelled through the treasury (% TBD)*	In progress: The share of aid delivered on treasury increased significantly: US\$ 100 million (approx. 14% of development aid) in 2017 compared with US\$ 55.3 million (8% of development aid) in 2016. However, this still fell short of the 15% target set in the Use of Country Systems

6. Partners increase share of development aid channelled through the SDRF Funds	Share declined: Share of development aid channelled through SDRF funds fell to 13% in 2017, compared with 19% and 21% in 2016 and 2016 respectively.
Coordination, Transparency & Accountability	Status 2017 Benchmarks
7. Government-led coordination mechanisms operationalized	Achieved: Revised aid architecture has been established. All of the Pillar Working Groups have met in their new configuration.
8. 90% of partners report aid flows to government in a timely manner*	In progress - Close to target 45 agencies and funds reported data, approximately 85% of active development partners
9. Government publishes monthly financial statements and audited annual statements*	In progress Audit General Office in progress to do so.
Cross-Cutting Themes	Status 2017 Benchmarks - Dec 17

	Roadmap. See pages 9-10 of Aid Flows report for more detail.
6. Partners increase share of development aid channelled through the SDRF Funds	In progress: Final figures for 2017 revealed a slight increase in development aid channelled through the pooled funds, although the overall share remains lower than it was in 2015. Donors channelled US\$ 145.2 million through the SDRF Funds in 2017 (20% of development aid) compared with US\$ 119.8 in 2016 (18% of development aid). See pages 11-15 of Aid Flows report for more detail.
Coordination, Transparency & Accountability	Status of Benchmarks as of July 2018
7. Pillar Working Groups developed and implement Annual Work Plans	In progress: Most PWG have developed annual work plans, are meeting, and are increasing discussion of relevant policy issues, projects and programs. Workshop held on 6 June to discuss how to make best use of SDRF architecture, including SDRF meetings and links to PWGs. Outcome document being prepared summarizing key recommendations from workshop to be taken forward by MoPIED, ACU and international partners over next 6 months to further strengthen SDRF and PWG working in support of shared priorities.
8. 95% of partners report aid flows to government in a timely manner*	In progress. See page 1 of Aid Flow report for list of reporting partners. The 2018 aid mapping exercise has yet to commence.
9. Robust audit function established*	In progress: Revised and translated audit bill is readily waiting for cabinet endorsement and onward submission to Parliament. The approval of the Bill will lay a good foundation towards restabilising the OAG as an independent entity - it is an on-going process.
- Revised audit law establishing legal framework to make audits public introduced to parliament	
- Auditor General's Office established as an independent entity	
Cross-Cutting Themes	Status of Benchmarks as of July 2018

<p>10. Increased % of development aid with a capacity development component</p>	<p>No change</p> <p>The share of aid with a capacity development component (81%) remained high but did not increase from the previous year.</p>
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<p>10. Increased % of development aid with a capacity development component</p>	<p>Not on track: The final figures from the last aid mapping exercise revealed the share of aid with a capacity development component fell from 81% in 2016 to 65%. However, part of the decline is due to increased reporting of humanitarian activities without a capacity development component. The overall volume of aid for capacity development rose in 2017 (See pages 65-66 of Aid Flow Report for more detail)</p>
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Source: ACU

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